Fordham Law Review
Volume 90

Issue 2

Article 14

2021

Stronger Than Ever: New York’s Rent Stabilization System
Survives Another Legal Challenge
Charles K. Gehnrich
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Housing Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate
Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles K. Gehnrich, Stronger Than Ever: New York’s Rent Stabilization System Survives Another Legal
Challenge, 90 Fordham L. Rev. 831 (2021).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol90/iss2/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

STRONGER THAN EVER: NEW YORK’S RENT
STABILIZATION SYSTEM SURVIVES ANOTHER
LEGAL CHALLENGE
Charles K. Gehnrich*
The fate of New York’s rent stabilization laws (RSL) directly concerns
millions of New York City residents who take shelter in the protection of the
RSL from the hardships and unfair business practices that accompany an
unregulated housing market during a housing crisis. After the New York
State Legislature made these tenant protections stronger than ever before in
2019, affected landlords responded by petitioning the courts to dismantle the
entire rent regulation regime. A federal district court in the Eastern District
of New York rejected the landlords’ broad constitutional challenge in
Community Housing Improvement Project v. City of New York, but
landlords have vowed to continue the legal fight, leaving the RSL in a state
of limbo.
This Note analyzes pressing arguments landlords have made in their
challenges to the RSL and the district court’s reasons for rejecting them.
Specifically, this Note addresses the claims that the amended RSL, on its face,
effectuates a regulatory taking of property and constitutes a violation of due
process. This Note argues that the district court’s decision in Community
Housing Improvement Project was correct and must be upheld in subsequent
appeals. However, this Note also addresses potential legal and policy issues
raised by the 2019 RSL and suggests amendments aimed at better ensuring
landlords a reasonable return on investment and more efficiently directing
the RSL’s protections toward those who truly need them.
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INTRODUCTION
New York City landlords and tenants’ rights advocates, who are
diametrically opposed foes,1 have long battled vigorously for the ears of
Albany lawmakers on the subject of rent regulation reform.2 In 2018, tenant
1. LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, The Room Where It Happens, on HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN
MUSICAL (Atl. Recording Corp. 2015).
2. See, e.g., Vivian Wang, Inside the Stealth Campaign for ‘Responsible Rent Reform,’
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/nyregion/rent-laws-
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advocates were emboldened when Democrats, “who promise[d] a
progressive agenda,” took control of the New York State Senate for the first
time since 2010.3 On June 14, 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo
signed into law the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 20194
(HSTPA), imposing “the strongest tenant protections in history.”5 Badly
wounded, landlord associations have attempted to shift the battle to the
courtroom.6
On July 15, 2019, New York City landlord associations filed a complaint
in the Eastern District of New York.7 The ensuing lawsuit, Community
Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York,8 challenged the facial
constitutionality of the HSTPA and the entirety of New York’s rent
stabilization apparatus.9
Separately, on November 14, 2019, a group of individual landlords filed a
complaint challenging New York’s rent stabilization laws (RSL) in the
Eastern District of New York,10 in 74 Pinehurst LLC v. State of New York.11
Besides raising arguments similar to those made in Community Housing
Improvement Program, 74 Pinehurst LLC discusses “as-applied
landlords-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/PG9J-8X4L] (reporting that the real estate industry
has channeled vast amounts of money and effort into creating a grass-roots-like campaign
against progressive rent reform proposals); Vivian Wang & Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Rent Laws:
Dozens Arrested at State Capitol as Debate Escalates, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/nyregion/rent-laws-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/Z5V2CJX4] (describing a scene of hundreds of tenant activists descending on the New York State
Capitol to pressure the New York State Legislature to pass stronger tenant protection rent
laws).
3. See Jimmy Vielkind, Democrats Take Control of New York State Senate for First Time
Since 2010, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democratstake-control-of-new-york-state-senate-for-first-time-since-2010-1541592631
[https://perma.cc/47WL-Q8EF]. Democratic Senate Leader Andrea Stewart-Cousins declared
that “[t]he voters of New York State have spoken . . . and we will finally give New Yorkers
the progressive leadership they have been demanding.” Id.
4. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36.
5. See Press Release, N.Y. State Senate, Senate Passes Strongest Tenant Protections in
State History (June 14, 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senatepasses-strongest-tenant-protections-state-history [https://perma.cc/BG5Q-737L] (statement
of Senate Majority Leader Andrea Stewart-Cousins, commending the New York State Senate
for passing the HSTPA).
6. See Bobby Allyn, New York Landlords Call Rent Control Laws an ‘Illegal Taking’ in
New Federal Lawsuit, NPR (July 17, 2019, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/
17/742875001/new-york-landlords-call-rent-control-laws-an-illegal-taking-in-new-federallawsu [https://perma.cc/M74B-JNDC]; Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Landlords Strike Back, Suing to
Dismantle Rent Regulation System, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/07/16/nyregion/ny-rent-regulation-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/S4NZ-EHMK].
7. Complaint, Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d
33 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-04087), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2,
2020).
8. 492 F. Supp. 3d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2,
2020).
9. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 1.
10. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Just Compensation, 74
Pinehurst LLC v. State of New York, No. 1:19-cv-6447, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217232
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Pinehurst Complaint].
11. No. 19-cv-6447, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217232 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2020).
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constitutional challenges” based on the regulations’ effects on individual
owners’ properties.12
On September 30, 2020, U.S. District Judge Eric R. Komitee delivered an
opinion in Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York,13
addressing both lawsuits’ overlapping arguments.14 The court dismissed the
Community Housing Improvement Program complaint (“the Community
Housing Complaint”) in its entirety and dismissed all claims brought in the
74 Pinehurst LLC Complaint (“the Pinehurst Complaint”), except
“as-applied regulatory-takings claims brought by certain Pinehurst
Plaintiffs.”15 The court reasoned that it would be inappropriate for a lower
court to ignore precedent supporting the RSL’s constitutionality, “even if the
2019 amendments go beyond prior regulations.”16 The plaintiff landlord
associations quickly appealed the decision on October 2, 2020, believing that
they would prevail at the appellate level.17
The ongoing legal challenge presents an existential threat to the RSL,
which regulates nearly one million New York City apartments housing
approximately two million people.18 Nonetheless, as the district court’s
dismissal suggests, landlords find themselves fighting against the current
because “[t]he odds are against a party seeking to prevail on a facial
challenge” to a rent regulation statute.19 In fact, all previous litigation
12. See Pinehurst Complaint, supra note 10, at 1.
13. 492 F. Supp. 3d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2,
2020).
14. See id. at 38. The moniker Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New
York is used for both the district court decision and the individual lawsuit brought by
Community Housing Improvement Program, which the district court decision addresses.
15. See id. In the simplest terms, facial challenges argue that a measure is unconstitutional
per se—or unconstitutional regardless of the factual circumstances involved in a particular
plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes,
46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994); Roger Pilon, Foreword, Facial v. As-Applied Challenges:
Does It Matter?, 2008–2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. vii, ix (2009). In contrast, as-applied
challenges argue that “a statute, even though generally constitutional, operates
unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the plaintiff’s particular circumstances.” Tex.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 n.16 (Tex. 1995); see also Dorf,
supra, at 236 (contrasting as-applied and facial constitutional challenges).
16. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 38.
17. Georgia Kromrei, That Was Fast: RSA and CHIP Appeal Rent Law Decision, REAL
DEAL (Oct. 2, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://therealdeal.com/2020/10/02/that-was-fast-rsa-and-chipappeal-rent-law-decision [https://perma.cc/6YMS-2QEA] (quoting a spokesperson for the
landlord associations as claiming: “we have always anticipated that we would be pursuing
our claims on appeal and that the appeals process would lead to our eventual success”).
18. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Commissioner Ruthanne Visnauskas’s
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 3, Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d
33 (No. 1:19-cv-04087) [hereinafter Memo for the Defendant] (citing SELECTED INITIAL
FINDINGS OF THE 2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 11 (2018),
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2017_
hvs_findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL54-WZU3]).
19. See Shelby D. Green et al., Landlord-Tenant Revolution Redux New York’s “Rad”
Landlord-Tenant Law Revisions, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2020, at 34, 38; see also
Ferré-Sadurní, supra note 6 (noting that the “Supreme Court has ultimately upheld rent
regulations” and, although landlords hope that a conservative majority Supreme Court will
reverse this trend, “reaching the Supreme Court could take years and chances are slim”).
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challenging the constitutionality of the RSL has failed, both at the federal and
state levels.20 Thus, this Note explores the question: Has New York’s RSL
finally pushed the boundaries too far?21
Part I of this Note explains New York’s RSL and examines its history with
a particular focus on the effects of the 2019 amendments enacted by the
HSTPA. It then introduces the lawsuits initiated by landlords in Community
Housing Improvement Program to challenge the constitutionality of the
RSL.22 Finally, Part I provides the relevant constitutional background for
the alleged facial constitutional violations.
Part II presents the legal arguments at the forefront of the Community
Housing Improvement Program litigation and analyzes them through case
law and scholarly policy opinions. The primary legal controversies this Note
addresses are whether the RSL as amended facially effectuates a regulatory
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment or violates due process as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Part III argues that the district court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’
broad facial regulatory takings and due process challenges in Community
Housing Improvement Program was correct and should be upheld on appeal.
The argument is grounded in precedent that has made clear that the issue of
rent control should be fought in the legislature, not in the courtroom.
However, it also acknowledges that the amended RSL pushes boundaries
that, if abused, may have a detrimental effect on both renters and owners and
could result in successful as-applied regulatory takings challenges.
Therefore, this Note proposes that: (1) regulated rent increases be tied to a
predetermined formula to better ensure property owners a reasonable return
on investment and incentivize necessary maintenance of the housing stock24
and (2) the RSL include means testing as a tenant qualification for obtaining
and maintaining occupancy in stabilized units to better achieve the legislative
goal of providing affordable housing to New York’s low- and middle-income
renters.25

20. See, e.g., Harmon v. Markus, 412 F. App’x. 420, 422 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub
nom. Harmon v. Kimmel, 566 U.S. 962 (2012); Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492
F. Supp. 3d at 38 (“No precedent binding on this Court has ever found any provision of a
rent-stabilization statute to violate the Constitution . . . .”); Rent Stabilization Ass’n v.
Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 632 (N.Y. 1993).
21. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”).
22. Unless otherwise specified, when this Note refers to Community Housing
Improvement Program, it is referencing the September 30, 2020, decision rendered by the
federal district court for the Eastern District of New York addressing both lawsuits challenging
the RSL.
23. Other challenges brought by plaintiffs in Community Housing Improvement Program
include facial physical takings claims, as-applied physical and regulatory takings claims, and
a Contracts Clause claim. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 43–44,
49–51, 52–54 (dismissing all of the aforementioned claims levied against the RSL with the
exception of certain as-applied regulatory takings challenges).
24. See infra Part III.A.2.
25. See infra Part III.B.2.
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I. THE RSL: A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY TAKES A RADICAL SHIFT
The RSL is a longstanding but frequently changing New York City rent
regulation regime that has often been the subject of bitter political and legal
battles.26 Part I.A briefly describes the RSL’s scope, purpose, and
components. Part I.B discusses major events in the RSL’s history, including
periods of increased and decreased regulatory power. Part I.C narrows the
focus to the RSL, as amended by the 2019 HSTPA, and details the
amendments at issue in the constitutional challenge to the RSL. Part I.D then
briefly introduces the district court’s decision to dismiss the landlords’ legal
challenge in Community Housing Improvement Program and the landlords’
plan to appeal. Lastly, Part I.E provides necessary constitutional background
for the relevant claims raised in Community Housing Improvement Program.
A. What Is the RSL?
In 1974, the New York State Legislature determined that a housing
emergency existed in areas of New York.27 It enacted the RSL as a necessary
measure to “prevent exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents
and rental agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other
disruptive practices.”28
The RSL is comprised of a variety of laws and regulations that have been
codified throughout New York’s legal system.29 Collectively, they regulate
rent increases, entitle tenants to certain services, require landlords to renew
tenant leases at the tenant’s will, and restrict the grounds for which a tenant
can be evicted.30
Generally, the RSL covers New York City buildings31 that contain six or
more dwelling units that were built between February 1, 1947, and January
1, 1974, and are not cooperatives (“co-ops”) or condominiums (“condos”).32
26. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra note 79 and accompanying text.
27. See Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8622
(McKinney 2019). In 2018, New York City determined that the housing emergency continues
to exist, allowing the RSL to remain in effect. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-502.
28. Id.
29. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-501 to 26-520; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8621–8634;
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2520–2531; see also Memo for the Defendant, supra
note 18, at 3 n.1 (providing a detailed description of where the RSL is codified).
30. Fact Sheet #1: Rent Stabilization and Rent Control, N.Y. STATE HOMES & CMTY.
RENEWAL OFF. OF RENT ADMIN. 1 (2020), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/
2020/11/fact-sheet-01-09-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SVH-TKPY]. Landlords can refuse to
renew a tenant’s lease in a stabilized unit if that tenant is not using the unit as a primary
residence. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.4(c).
31. The HSTPA expands the RSL’s coverage—which previously applied only to New
York City and the counties of Nassau, Westchester, and Rockland—to New York City and
“all counties within the state of New York,” but this Note is just concerned with New York
City. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. G, § 3.
32. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504 (specifying the applicability of the RSL); Fact
Sheet #1: Rent Stabilization and Rent Control, supra note 30, at 1 (“Rent stabilization
generally covers buildings built after 1947 and before 1974 . . . .”); Rent Stabilized Building
Lists, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/
resources/rent-stabilized-building-lists [https://perma.cc/RRD9-PX8W] (last visited Sept. 17,
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However, many apartments, despite fitting the above description, have
become deregulated,33 through either luxury or high-income decontrol.34
Additionally, newly constructed buildings that receive 421-a or J-51 tax
exemptions may be stabilized even if the rent exceeds the luxury decontrol
threshold.35
According to the New York City Rent Guidelines Board (RGB), a city
agency, the main tenets of the RSL are to “preserve the basic affordability of
rental housing” and to promote “habitability and security of tenure” among
regulated tenants.36 The issue of “fair returns for affected owners” is also an
important consideration.37 The RGB is tasked with establishing annual
guidelines for rent adjustments of stabilized units.38 These guidelines impose
a percentage cap on allowable rent increases for leases of one and two
years.39 In determining the allowable rent increases for New York City’s
2021) (explaining that, in general, rent-stabilized buildings were built before 1974, contain six
or more units, and are neither co-ops nor condos). A condo is a private residence in a multiunit
building that includes ownership of commonly used property. See Lester Davis, Condo vs.
Co-Op: Know the Differences Before Buying One, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/condo-vs-co-op-know-the-differences-beforebuying-one/2018/01/30/804e7bd6-faf5-11e7-ad8c-ecbb62019393_story.html
[https://perma.cc/9SNH-VUNJ] (“Co-ops are collectively owned and managed by their
residents, who own shares in a nonprofit corporation.”). For more information on the RSL as
it applies to condo and co-op conversions, see Co-ops & Condos FAQ, N.Y.C. RENT
GUIDELINES BD., https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/resources/faqs/co-ops-condos
[https://perma.cc/A4AZ-LMHG] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
33. “Deregulation occurs by action of the owner when an apartment under either rent
control or rent stabilization legally meets the criteria for leaving regulation. When an
apartment is deregulated, the rent may be set at ‘market rate.’” Glossary of Rent Regulation
Terms, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/
resources/glossary-of-rent-regulation-terms/ [https://perma.cc/F6K4-DCBF] (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021).
34. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., CHANGES TO THE RENT STABILIZED HOUSING
STOCK IN NYC IN 2019, at 7–8 (2020), https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/2020-Changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZRR-FZ29] (finding that
168,170 units were deregulated due to “High-Rent Vacancy Deregulation” and 6615 units
were deregulated due to “High-Rent High-Income Deregulation”). This Note, following the
terminology used by the parties to Community Housing Improvement Program, refers to
“high-rent vacancy deregulation” as “luxury decontrol” and “high-rent high-income
deregulation” as “high income decontrol.” See Complaint, supra note 7, at 19; Memo for the
Defendant, supra note 18, at 9. For more information on luxury and high-income decontrol,
see infra Parts I.B.3, I.C.2.
35. See Rent Stabilized Building Lists, supra note 32 (“Buildings which are listed as
‘421.a’ or ‘j-51’ are stabilized because they took advantage of the 421-a or J-51 tax exemption
program. These buildings remain rent-stabilized for the length of the tax exemption, and
thereafter may be deregulated if the buildings were not stabilized prior to the participation in
the tax exemption program.”).
36. See TIMOTHY L. COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY RENT
GUIDELINES BOARD AND THE RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM 55 (rev. ed. 2020),
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/intro2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PT7B-R3G5].
37. See id. at 55–56.
38. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(b).
39. See id.; COLLINS, supra note 36, at 82. Under certain conditions, regulated rent may
exceed RGB-sanctioned increases. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6), (c)(13)
(providing exceptions where a landlord undertakes individual apartment improvements and
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stabilized apartments, the RGB considers a multitude of factors, including
economic conditions of the rental real estate industry, cost of living statistics,
and any other relevant data made available to the RGB.40
The New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal
(DHCR) is the executive agency responsible for overseeing nearly all aspects
of the state’s low- and moderate-income affordable housing.41 The DHCR
is charged with administering the RSL.42 The DHCR’s responsibilities
include: promulgating regulations governing the RSL, codified as the Rent
Stabilization Code (“the Code”); administering various filings and
registrations; and adjudicating claims brought by landlords and tenants
pursuant to the Code.43
B. A Brief History of the RSL
Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the U.S. Congress passed the
Emergency Price Control Act of 194244 (EPCA). The ECPA instituted a
nationwide price regulation system affecting various industries, including
housing, to “prevent wartime profiteering.”45 In 1947, the EPCA expired
and was replaced by the Housing and Rent Act of 1947.46 The new law kept
rent control in place for all buildings built before February 1, 1947, but
removed control for new construction.47 The federal government used rent
control measures to set ceilings on rent that landlords may charge tenants.
On July 1, 1953, Congress removed all federal rent control mechanisms,
while allowing states to implement their own rent control laws.48 By 1961,
New York City was the only location in the United States that still maintained

major capital improvements). For an explanation of individual apartment improvements and
major capital improvements rent regulation provisions, see infra Part I.C.2.
40. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(b); see also COLLINS, supra note 36, at 82–104
(providing a more in-depth explanation of the duties of the RGB and the factors used to
determine the annual rent guideline increases).
41. See Division of Housing and Community Renewal, N.Y. STATE HOMES & CMTY.
RENEWAL, https://hcr.ny.gov/division-housing-and-community-renewal [https://perma.cc/
6XB8-7V6L] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
42. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 74–75.
43. See id.
44. Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1947).
45. Guy McPherson, Note, It’s the End of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine):
Rent Regulation in New York City and the Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1133 (2004); see also N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL
OFF. OF RENT ADMIN., RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS: AN OVERVIEW OF NEW YORK
STATE’S RENT REGULATED HOUSING 1993, at 3 (1993) [hereinafter RENT REGULATION AFTER
50 YEARS], http://www.tenant.net/Oversight/50yrRentReg/50yr.html [https://perma.cc/
TDY7-CRD9].
46. Pub. L. No. 80-129, 61 Stat. 193 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1744).
47. See McPherson, supra note 45, at 1134.
48. See id. at 1134–35.
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a rent control system.49 Throughout the 1960s, New York City implemented
measures that gradually eroded its rent control system.50
1. The Creation of the RSL
By 1969, the country was experiencing a severe economic downturn due
to rising inflation caused by the Vietnam War.51 In New York City, housing
production slumped, and the vacancy rate “fell drastically” from 3.2 percent
in 1965 to 1.23 percent in 1968.52
New York City enacted the Rent Stabilization Law of 196953 in response
to rapidly rising rents in unregulated apartments and a shortage of affordable
housing.54 The law regulated buildings with six or more units constructed
after February 1, 1947.55 Unlike rent control, the Rent Stabilization Law of
1969 regulated rent through leases rather than statutes.56 It obligated
landlords of stabilized units to renew leases to their tenants and provided that
the RGB set allowable rent increases for the following year.57
2. Deregulation and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974
In 1971, the New York State Legislature “passed several laws designed to
deregulate” all rent-regulated housing.58 This included vacancy decontrol
measures, which deregulated rent controlled and stabilized units that were
voluntarily vacated after July 1, 1971.59 The Urstadt Law60 further
undermined New York City’s rent regulation regime by prohibiting any

49. Id. at 1135. The number of units subject to rent control in New York State dropped
from 2.5 million in 1950 to 1.8 million in 1961. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS,
supra note 45, at 3–4. In New York, rent control is a rent regulation system which is entirely
separate from the later-enacted RSL and generally applies to tenants of buildings built before
February 1, 1947, where the tenant has continuously occupied the unit prior to July 1, 1971.
See
Rent
Control
FAQ,
N.Y.C.
RENT
GUIDELINES
BD.,
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/resources/faqs/rent-control/#difference
[https://perma.cc/79CU-H38S] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). Rent control is also administered
by the DHCR and restricts a landlord’s ability to evict tenants and raise rents. See Fact Sheet
#1: Rent Stabilization and Rent Control, supra note 30, at 2–3. New York’s rent control
system is not at issue in this Note.
50. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7. Presently, there are
only approximately 22,000 rent-controlled apartments remaining. See Rent Control FAQ,
supra note 49.
51. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7.
52. See id.
53. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-503.
54. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 26–27.
55. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
56. See McPherson, supra note 45, at 1136.
57. See supra Part I.A (explaining the RSL).
58. RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7; see also 1971 N.Y. Laws
371.
59. See 1971 N.Y. Laws 371; RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7.
60. 1971 N.Y. Laws 372. This law is commonly referred to as the “Urstadt Law” after
the then-State Housing Commissioner Charles Urstadt. See McPherson, supra note 45, at 1126
n.9; RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7.
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municipality from passing rent regulations that were stronger than state
regulations.61
Between 1971 and 1973, rapid deregulation of controlled and stabilized
apartments, coupled with soaring inflation rates, resulted in huge rent
increases.62 Responding to this housing crisis, Governor Nelson Rockefeller
assembled a committee led by Assemblyman Andrew Stein to investigate and
evaluate the impact of vacancy decontrol.63 The committee issued a scathing
rebuke (“the Stein Report”) to the state’s vacancy decontrol measures,
finding that they had “[n]o beneficial side effects,” resulted in large rent
increases, inflicted tenant hardship, and did not lead to major capital
investments or new construction.64
Ultimately, the Stein Report
recommended that “vacancy decontrol should be repealed.”65
In June 1974, the New York legislature passed the Emergency Tenant
Protection Act of 197466 (ETPA). The ETPA allowed local governments to
declare a housing emergency and implement rent regulation where the
vacancy rate was lower than 5 percent.67 New York City immediately
declared a housing emergency68 and re-regulated units that had been
deregulated by vacancy decontrol.69
3. Deregulation Returns
In 1993, New York enacted the Rent Regulation Reform Act,70 which
introduced deregulation measures to the RSL.71 Luxury decontrol was one
such measure. It allowed owners to “permanently deregulate apartments that
had a legal regulated monthly rent of $2,000 or higher when they became
vacant.”72 The $2000 threshold was raised to $2500 in 201173 and raised
again to $2700 in 2015.74 The threshold was to be adjusted each subsequent

61. See 1971 N.Y. Laws 372; McPherson, supra note 45, at 1137–38.
62. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7 (noting that from July
1971 through December 1973, approximately 300,000 rent-controlled units and 88,000
rent-stabilized apartments were deregulated).
63. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 28–29.
64. TEMP. STATE COMM’N ON LIVING COSTS AND THE ECON., 1974 STEIN REPORT ON
VACANCY DECONTROL 3–4, 21 (1974) (finding that, on average, vacancy decontrol led to a
52-percent rent increase in formerly rent-controlled apartments and a 19-percent increase in
rent-stabilized apartments in New York City).
65. Id. at 21.
66. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8621–8634 (McKinney 2019).
67. See id. § 8623.
68. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501.
69. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7. The Rent Stabilization
Law of 1969 also stabilized buildings constructed between March 11, 1969, and December
31, 1973. See id.
70. 1993 N.Y. Laws 253.
71. See Memo for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 8; McPherson, supra note 45, at 1140.
72. Memo for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 8 (citing 1993 N.Y. Laws 253); see
McPherson, supra note 45, at 1140 (explaining luxury decontrol).
73. See Memo for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 8 (citing 2011 N.Y. Laws 97).
74. See id. (citing 2015 N.Y. Laws 20).
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year by the same rate as the RGB one-year rent renewal increase
percentage.75
Another measure—high-income decontrol—permitted “owners to
permanently deregulate occupied apartments with rents of $2,000 or more
and tenants whose household annual income exceeded $250,000 in each of
the prior two years.”76 The income requirement was reduced to $175,000 in
1997,77 and then raised to $200,000 alongside an increase in the rental
threshold to $2500 in 2011.78
Incredibly contentious debate over the RSL in the state legislature
preceded the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997,79 which reduced the
income requirement for high-income decontrol, allowed owners to increase
rent up to 20 percent upon vacancy of the unit (known as a “vacancy bonus”),
restricted tenant succession rights, and imposed several other
landlord-friendly measures that allowed rents to increase quickly.80
The Rent Act of 201181 and the Rent Act of 201582 began a moderate shift
away from the statutory gains previously won by landlord advocates.83
Besides the aforementioned adjustments to luxury and high-income
decontrol, amendments to the RSL included limits on the allowable
frequency and percentage of vacancy increases and small reforms to major
capital improvements (MCIs) and individualized apartment improvements
(IAIs).84 With the 2015 RSL regime set to expire in four years, the stage was
set for a renewed fight in 2019.85
C. The Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019
The HSTPA sought to protect affordable housing primarily by eliminating
avenues for landlords to remove their units from RSL regulation and by
curtailing landlords’ ability to increase rents above the RGB’s allowable rent

75. See id. (citing 2015 N.Y. Laws 20).
76. Id. (citing 1993 N.Y. Laws 253) (explaining high-income decontrol).
77. See id. (citing 1997 N.Y. Laws 116).
78. See id. (citing 2011 N.Y. Laws 97).
79. 1997 N.Y. Laws 116; see McPherson, supra note 45, at 1140–41 (“Senator Bruno
called for the complete abolition of rent regulation in New York State. Senator Bruno’s
statement ‘transformed an insider’s game—fought with campaign contributions, backroom
lobbying and arcane legislative maneuvers—into a media spectacle, a holy war.’” (quoting
James Dao & Richard Pérez-Peña, Rent War Redux: As Dust Settles, A Tortuous Inside Story
Emerges, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/29/nyregion/rentwar-redux-as-dust-settles-a-tortuous-inside-story-emerges.html
[https://perma.cc/G429WVFM])); see also Craig Gurian, Let Them Rent Cake: George Pataki, Market Ideology, and
the Attempt to Dismantle Rent Regulation in New York, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 339, 339–40,
351–54 (2004) (describing the bitter political fight over rent regulations in New York City
leading up to the 1997 amendments to New York’s RSL).
80. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 34–36.
81. 2011 N.Y. Laws 97.
82. 2015 N.Y. Laws 20.
83. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 36–37.
84. See id.; 2011 N.Y. Laws 97; 2015 N.Y. Laws 20. For an explanation of MCI and IAI
rent regulation provisions, see infra Part I.C.2.
85. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 37.
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increases. In doing so, the 2019 amendments to the RSL radically shifted the
law in favor of tenant advocates.
1. The Buildup to Change
In 2018, the New York City Council paved the way for changes to the RSL
regime, which was set to expire in June 2019,86 by reaffirming the existence
of an ongoing housing crisis in New York City.87 Before the vote, New York
City Council Speaker Corey Johnson voiced his support for extending the
emergency finding and aligned himself with tenant advocates committed to
strengthening the RSL to “protect” affordable housing.88
Advocates of stronger rent stabilization decried the RSL provisions that
undermined the laws’ effectiveness, encouraged tenant harassment, and
incubated rampant fraud.89 As of 2019, nearly 175,000 stabilized units had
been lost to luxury and high-rent decontrol provisions in the RSL.90
Advocates zealously pushed for strong reforms to maintain affordable
housing.91 Conversely, landlord associations warned that proposed changes
to the RSL were untenable and would result in a steep decline in the quality
of the city’s housing stock.92
On June 14, 2019, the newly Democrat-controlled state legislature
followed through on its progressive platform and enacted “the strongest
tenant protections in history.”93 Tenant advocates celebrated the HSTPA as
“a much-needed adjustment in the balance of the fortunes of those needing
accessible housing,” while property owners and investors regarded the law
as “concernedly ‘radical’” and an infringement on property rights.94

86. See 2015 N.Y. Laws 20, pt. A, § 1.
87. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-502.
88. See N.Y.C. COUNCIL, TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES OF THE CITY COUNCIL STATED
MEETING 44 (Mar. 22, 2018) (transcribing New York City Council Speaker Corey Johnson’s
proclamation that “the easiest way to protect affordable housing is to preserve the affordable
housing that we have and to strengthen the rent laws”).
89. See OKSANA MIRONOVA & JEFF JONES, CLOSING THE LOOPHOLES 1–10 (2019),
https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/rent_loopholes_
FINAL_for_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ78-PRFQ] (demonstrating how the then-current
RSL could be manipulated, legally and illegally, to hike rents and rapidly deregulate
apartments); Justin R. La Mort, The Theft of Affordable Housing: How Rent-Stabilized
Apartments Are Disappearing from Fraudulent Individual Apartment Improvements and What
Can Be Done to Save Them, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351, 360–64 (2016) (arguing
that the then-current RSL’s individual apartment improvement provision was facilitating fraud
and leading to rampant deregulation of stabilized units).
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., MIRONOVA & JONES, supra note 89, at 10; Wang & Ferré-Sadurní, supra
note 2 (reporting on tenants zealously protesting at the New York State Capitol in an attempt
to spur action for stronger rent reform).
92. See Testimony of the Real Estate Board of New York Before the Rent Guidelines Board
Regarding Lease Renewal Guidelines for 2019, REAL EST. BD. OF N.Y. (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.rebny.com/content/rebny/en/newsroom/testimony/2019_Testimony/RentGuidelines-Board_Lease-Renewal-Guidelines-2019.html [https://perma.cc/E475-XDLA].
93. Press Release, supra note 5.
94. Green et al., supra note 19, at 34.
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2. The New Amendments to the RSL
Several HSTPA provisions spurred New York City landlords to pursue
legal action against the entire RSL regime.95 First, the HSTPA eliminated
luxury and high-income decontrol.96 Owners could no longer deregulate a
unit when it reached a certain rent threshold, regardless of the tenant’s
income.97 Tenants praised the move for removing measures that led over
170,000 stabilized units to be eliminated and incentivized landlords to
engineer rent hikes and harass tenants.98 Landlords viewed the move as
inconsistent with the goal of providing affordable housing to vulnerable
renters because repealing luxury and high-income decontrol benefits wealthy
tenants living in stabilized apartments.99
Second, the HSTPA eliminated vacancy and longevity increases.100 The
HSTPA prohibits the RGB from creating any statutory rent increases for
vacancies and prolonged tenant occupancy.101 Previously, landlords could
increase a unit’s rent by 20 percent during vacancies and apply an additional
0.6 percent per year “longevity bonus” on rent for units that have not been
vacant for eight or more years.102 Tenants supported the change as
eliminating a financial incentive to harass and evict tenants.103 Landlords
agreed that it removed the incentive to evict because they could no longer
justify the cost of expensive eviction proceedings, which would lead to more
problematic tenants and fewer vacancies.104
Third, the HSTPA capped and further restricted rent increases for IAIs105
and MCIs.106 The RSL’s IAI provision allows landlords to pass on the cost
of individual apartment improvements to the tenant.107 Before the 2019
amendments, “[o]wners could increase the monthly rent by 1/40th of the cost
of the improvement in buildings with 35 or fewer apartments and 1/60th in
buildings with 36 or more apartments.”108 The HSTPA reduced allowable
95. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 1–2. For a list of HSTPA provisions at issue in the
lawsuit, see id. at 25–28.
96. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. D, § 5 (repealing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-504.2, 26504.3).
97. See id.
98. See Gerald Lebovits et al., New York’s Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act
of 2019: What Lawyers Must Know, 29 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 75, 95 (2020).
99. See id. at 96 (“[A]bolishing luxury deregulation permits the possibility of a tenant with
$1M annual income living in a $10,000/month rent-stabilized apartment”).
100. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. C, § 1 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(j)).
101. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(j).
102. Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 95.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. K, §§ 1, 2 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(13)).
The abbreviation “IAI” stands for “individual apartment improvements.” See supra note 84
and accompanying text.
106. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. K, §§ 4, 11 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6)).
The abbreviation “MCI” stands for “major capital improvements.” See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
107. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(13).
108. Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 99.
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rent increases to 1/168th (for buildings with thirty-five or fewer units) and
1/180th (for buildings with thirty-six or more units) of the cost of the
improvement.109 Further, the HSTPA permits “no more than three separate
IAIs, with a total aggregate cost of no more than $15,000.00, within a 15-year
period.”110 IAIs were formerly uncapped.111 Tenants supported the change,
arguing that landlords exploited the former IAI provisions to increase rent
and deregulate apartments through unnecessary cosmetic improvements and
fraud.112 Landlords warned that the change removed incentives for landlords
to maintain their properties and would lead to dilapidated buildings and
warehousing of vacant units.113
The RSL’s MCI provision allows landlords to pass on the costs of major
building improvements to their tenants.114 Before, owners could recoup their
MCI costs over an eight-year amortization period (for buildings with
thirty-five or fewer units) or a nine-year amortization period (for buildings
with thirty-six or more units), with annual rent increases capped at 6
percent.115 The HSTPA increased the amortization period to twelve and
twelve-and-a-half years, respectively, and caps the annual rent increase at 2
percent.116 As with IAIs, landlords complain that the RSL’s regulated
method for recovering MCI costs is insufficient.117 The HSTPA also made
the rent increases associated with IAIs and MCIs temporary and required
their removal from the rent after thirty years.118
Fourth, the HSTPA further limited landlords’ ability to convert regulated
rental units to co-op or condo ownership.119 The RSL allows owners to
remove apartments from regulation through condo and co-op conversion.120
109. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(13).
110. Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 100.
111. See id. at 99.
112. See id. at 100. Tenant advocates argue that the RSL’s IAI regime incentivizes fraud
due to inadequate oversight of reported IAI expenses coupled with the potential for sizeable
rent increases. Id.; see also La Mort, supra note 89, at 361–62.
113. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 101; Josh Barbanel, New York Landlords Slow
Apartment Upgrades, Blame New Rent Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-landlords-slow-apartment-upgrades-blame-newrent-law-11576756800 [https://perma.cc/TJ72-SA7Q]. Warehousing occurs when a landlord
decides not to relet a vacant apartment. See Alanna Schubach, Why Do Some NYC Landlords
Leave Apartments Empty?, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Aug. 30, 2017, 11:39 AM),
https://www.brickunderground.com/rent/why-landlords-leave-apartments-empty
[https://perma.cc/B9R3-GS3D]. Landlords have threatened to leave vacant apartments empty
because the amended IAI provision prevents them from recovering the cost of repairs required
to re-rent them. See Austin Havens-Bowen, New Bill Aims to Fine Landlords Who Warehouse
Rent-Stabilized Apartments, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Mar. 13, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.brickunderground.com/rent/new-bill-to-fine-landlords-who-warehouse-rentstabilized-apartments-nyc [https://perma.cc/DQG9-LJLX].
114. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6). Common examples of MCIs include the
installation of a new boiler or plumbing system. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 99.
115. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 99.
116. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6).
117. Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 101.
118. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6), (c)(13).
119. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. N, § 1 (amending N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee).
120. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee.
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However, it limits the availability of this conversion process by eliminating
eviction plan conversions and raising the requirement that owners obtain
purchase agreements from 15 percent of tenants to 51 percent of tenants in
noneviction conversion plans.121 Tenants praised these changes as removing
a tool for landlords to convert affordable housing into apartments that most
New Yorkers cannot afford.122 Landlords believed that raising the
conversion threshold to 51 percent in order to convert their building to a
co-op or condo effectively transfers the decision to tenants, which improperly
violates their right to dispose of property and reduces the building’s value.123
Fifth, the HSTPA eliminated preferential rent increases.124 Under the
RSL, landlords may charge a tenant less than the legal rent; this is known as
preferential rent.125 Before the 2019 amendments, landlords could reserve
the right to charge the legal rent upon the expiration of a lease charging the
preferential rent.126 The HSTPA made preferential rent permanent while the
tenant remains in the apartment and only allows owners to charge the legal
rent upon vacancy.127 Tenants supported the change because it prevents
landlords from abruptly and significantly raising renewal rents, which can
price current tenants out.128 Landlords characterized the change as unfair
and harmful to owners’ expected return on investment.129
Sixth, the HSTPA reduced the personal use exemption.130 The RSL
provides landlords with the means to recover a rented apartment for personal
use under certain circumstances.131 Before the 2019 amendments, owners
could recover a rented unit upon a showing that either they or their immediate
family member sought to occupy the apartment for personal use as a primary
residence.132 The HSTPA constricted the personal use exemption by limiting
recovery to one unit per building for use as a primary residence and only
121. See id. § 352-eeee(1)(c); Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 97. Under eviction plan
conversions, stabilized renters who do not purchase their units pursuant to the conversion plan
can be evicted. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(c). Under noneviction plan
conversions, stabilized renters who do not purchase their units may continue to occupy their
apartments indefinitely as rent-stabilized tenants. See Co-ops & Condos FAQ, supra note 32.
122. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 97.
123. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 26–27.
124. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. E, § 2 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(14)).
125. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 98. Generally, landlords will give a preferential
rent when they cannot find a tenant willing to lease at the legal rent. See id.
126. See id.
127. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(14); Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 98 (“All
rent increases for lease renewals must be based on the preferential rent.”).
128. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 98; MIRONOVA & JONES, supra note 89, at 4–5
(using real examples to demonstrate how under the previous RSL regime, preferential rent
could be used in conjunction with other RSL provisions to push out tenants and quickly
deregulate units through luxury decontrol).
129. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 102–03.
130. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. I, § 2 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(9)(b)).
131. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(9)(b).
132. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. I, § 2; Complaint, supra note 7, at 79. Courts interpreted
the personal use exemption to require a showing of good faith by the landlord wishing to
recover a regulated unit. See, e.g., Pennella v. Joy, 433 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (App. Div. 1980)
(rejecting landlord’s attempt to recover a regulated unit for personal use because the landlord’s
request lacked “good faith”).
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upon a showing of “immediate and compelling necessity.”133 Landlords
decried the change as a clear restriction on their right to possess and use their
private property.134
Seventh, the HSTPA extended the RSL’s post-breach relief provisions.135
In some cases, the RSL protects tenants even after a landlord has evicted a
tenant through judicial proceedings.136 Before the 2019 amendments, if the
landlord won an eviction proceeding against a holdover tenant,137 the tenant
had ten days to cure the breach, and the court could stay the eviction warrant
for up to six months.138 The HSTPA extended the cure period for holdover
breaches to thirty days and allowed judges to stay an eviction warrant for up
to one year for both holdover and nonpayment evictions.139 Judges may
grant stays of eviction after determining that eviction would cause the tenant
or the tenant’s family “extreme hardship.”140 Landlords contended that they
should not be responsible for alleviating the hardship of particular tenants
and that the post-breach relief provisions “contribute[] to the confiscatory
and irrational nature” of the RSL.141
Lastly, the HSTPA permanently codified the RSL by eliminating the
sunset provision.142 The sunset provision has been a staple of all previous
versions of the RSL.143 Now, the HSTPA will remain the governing law
until there is “political consensus [for amending the RSL] among the [New
York State] Senate, Assembly, and Governor.”144

133. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(9)(b).
134. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 79–80.
135. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. M, § 21 (amending N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 753
(Consol. 2020)).
136. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 753 (Consol. 2020).
137. A holdover tenant is a tenant who is being evicted for reasons other than the
nonpayment of rent. See THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & THE CIV. CT. OF N.Y,
A TENANT’S GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT 5 (2006) [hereinafter A TENANT’S
GUIDE TO HOUSING COURT], https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/tenantsguide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JF93-M45N].
138. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 117.
139. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 753(1). Nonpayment evictions are caused by a
tenant’s failure to pay rent. See A TENANT’S GUIDE TO HOUSING COURT, supra note 137, at 2.
Holdover evictions are evictions for reasons other than nonpayment of the rent. See id. at 5.
140. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 753(1), (4). Judges may consider factors such as
health, a child’s enrollment in school, and “other extenuating life circumstances affecting the
ability of the [tenant] or the [tenant’s] family to relocate and maintain quality of life.” Id.
§ 753(1).
141. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ and
Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss at 3, Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York,
492 F. Supp. 3d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-04087), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d
Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Memo for the Plaintiff].
142. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. A. The sunset provision is “a date by which the
Legislature must renew the rent laws to prevent their expiration.” Lebovits et al., supra note
98, at 93.
143. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 93.
144. Id. However, the City Council will still have to determine that a housing emergency
exists every three years for the RSL to remain in effect. Id. at 94.
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D. Landlords Turn to the Courts
On June 15, 2019, New York City real estate associations representing
landlord interests filed a lawsuit “intended to dismantle the entire
rent-regulation system, which dictates the rents of about 2.4 million
tenants.”145 The plaintiffs insisted that the RSL has always been
unconstitutional but the HSTPA amendments leave “no doubt that the RSL’s
irrationality and arbitrariness, and its web of restrictions override core rights
of property owners and impose unconstitutional burdens on property
owners.”146 They claim that the RSL on its face violates the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause, as both a physical and regulatory
uncompensated taking, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.147
On November 14, 2019, a group of individual landlords (“the Pinehurst
Plaintiffs”) separately filed a legal challenge to the RSL in federal court.148
Besides the claims already noted above, the lawsuit made as-applied physical
and regulatory takings claims and asserted that the RSL violates the Contracts
Clause.149
On September 30, 2020, the district court dismissed all the facial
challenges to the RSL raised by both plaintiff groups.150 Anticipating this
result at the district court level, landlords quickly appealed the decision.151
Landlord
interest
groups
anticipate
that
a
conservative,
property-rights-friendly U.S. Supreme Court will grant certiorari.152
145. See Ferré-Sadurní, supra note 6. The plaintiffs listed in the complaint include two
New York real estate trade associations, the Rent Stabilization Association of N.Y.C. (RSA)
and the Community Housing Improvement Program (CHIP), and individual landlords of
rent-stabilized buildings. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 9–11. The defendants are the City
of New York, the RGB, and individual members of the DHCR and RGB. See id. at 11–12.
146. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1–2.
147. See id. at 1; see also Kathryn Brenzel, What You Need to Know About Landlords’
Challenge to New York’s Rent Law, REAL DEAL (July 16, 2019, 5:55 PM),
https://therealdeal.com/2019/07/16/what-you-need-to-know-about-landlords-challenge-tonew-yorks-rent-law/ [https://perma.cc/96Z6-VSAW].
148. See Pinehurst Complaint, supra note 10, at 1.
149. See id. at 2–4. This Note primarily focuses on the landlords’ facial regulatory takings
and due process challenges to the RSL’s constitutionality, rather than the facial physical
takings, as-applied takings, and Contract Clause challenges.
150. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 38
(E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020). The court refused to
dismiss the Pinehurst Plaintiff’s as-applied challenges “at this stage.” Id.
151. See Kromrei, supra note 17.
152. See Ryan Deffenbaugh, Landlords Take Rent-Control Fight to Federal Court,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (July 16, 2019, 9:35 AM), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/realestate/landlords-take-rent-control-fight-federal-court [https://perma.cc/KV86-JUB3] (noting
that the Supreme Court is more conservative than it was in 2012, when it refused to hear
Harmon v. Markus, 412 F. App’x. 420, 422 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Harmon v.
Kimmel, 566 U.S. 962 (2012), a similar case challenging the RSL); see also Real Deal, Inside
Real Estate’s Legal Challenge to the Rent Law, YOUTUBE (June 16, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKxOuCtGJD0
[https://perma.cc/GN6B-XA6K]
(interviewing landlord plaintiffs’ attorney, Andrew Pincus, who anticipates that the case will
need to be heard by all three levels of the federal judiciary to be resolved). Since the lawsuit
began, the Supreme Court has grown more conservative with the appointment of Justice
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E. Constitutional Amendments at Issue in Community Housing
Improvement Program
In Community Housing Improvement Program, landlords adamantly
challenged the constitutionality of the RSL.153 This Note examines the
plaintiffs’ contention that the RSL violates the Fifth Amendment as an
uncompensated regulatory taking of private property, and the Fourteenth
Amendment as a violation of due process.154
1. Fifth Amendment Regulatory Takings
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”155 Traditionally, the
government violates this right by authorizing a “physical occupation of
property (or actually tak[ing] title).”156 Where the government “requires the
landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land,” it can be said
that the government has physically taken the land.157
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,158 the Supreme Court determined that
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause also required the government to
compensate citizens whose property was subjected to such onerous
regulation that it was effectively taken from them.159 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. explained, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”160 Such a taking
is known as a regulatory taking. To determine if a legislative measure
amounts to a regulatory taking, one must first identify the line of demarcation
dividing the valid use of a state’s power161 from invalid regulations that
“forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”162
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,163 the Court failed
to deliver this clear line; instead, it developed an “ad hoc, factual inquir[y]”
for evaluating regulatory takings claims.164 The framework includes analysis
Barrett. See Kathryn Brenzel, Supreme Court Shift Could Favor Rent Law Challengers, REAL
DEAL (Oct. 28, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://therealdeal.com/2020/10/28/supreme-court-shiftcould-favor-rent-law-challengers [https://perma.cc/BJ92-UXNV].
153. See generally Complaint, supra note 7.
154. See id. at 2–5, 6–9.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
156. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992).
157. Id. at 527. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court
concluded that a law compelling owners of residential buildings to allow cable companies to
install and attach cable boxes to their buildings to provide tenants with access to cable
television was an unconstitutional taking, without regard to the public interest served by the
regulation or the size of the area actually being occupied. 458 U.S. 419, 426, 436–37 (1982).
158. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
159. See id. at 415; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–38 (2005).
160. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
161. See id. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”).
162. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
163. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
164. Id. at 124.
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of the “character of the governmental action,” the “economic impact” on the
regulated property’s value, and the interference with owners’ reasonable
investment-backed expectations (“the Penn Central test”).165 In Penn
Central, the Court found that a regulation designating Grand Central as a
state landmark and prohibiting the owners from using the property in ways
that too greatly diminished its historical and aesthetic value was not a
regulatory taking on its face.166 The owners retained the right to use and
possess Grand Central, and the regulation neither too greatly diminished the
overall economic value of the property nor impeded investment-backed
expectations.167
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”168 The
Due Process Clause has been interpreted to protect individuals against both
procedural169 and, more controversially, substantive170 violations of their
rights.171 Generally, when economic and land use regulations that do not
disturb fundamental rights are challenged on due process grounds, such
regulations are subject only to rational basis review, which assesses whether
the measures are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.172
In assessing a due process challenge to a San Jose rent control ordinance
in Pennell v. City of San Jose,173 the Court stated that “[p]rice control is
‘unconstitutional . . . if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant

165. Id. In the past, the Court evaluated whether the regulation “substantially advance[d]
legitimate state interests.” See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). In 2005,
the Court explicitly abandoned this test as part of its takings analysis. See Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
166. 438 U.S. at 108–10, 135–38.
167. See id. at 130–31.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
169. “‘Procedural due process’ concerns the procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property.” Nathan S. Chapman & Kenji
Yoshino, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendmentxiv/clauses/701 [https://perma.cc/8YXQ-ZFHL] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
170. Substantive due process concerns the idea that some rights are too important to be
infringed by the government, regardless of the process given. See id.
171. See id.; see also Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST.
COMMENT. 253, 257–60 (2016) (providing both criticism of substantive due process by
prominent legal scholars and a defense of the concept).
172. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82–83
(1978); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478,
486–87 (2d Cir. 1995); Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and The Takings Clause,
1989 WIS. L. REV. 925, 945–46. For a brief summary of the development of the Supreme
Court’s economic substantive due process jurisprudence, see The Rise and Fall of Economic
Substantive
Due
Process,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/the-rise-and-fallof-economic-substantive-due-process-overview [https://perma.cc/PXJ9-J5TA] (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021).
173. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
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to the policy the legislature is free to adopt . . . .’”174 The case demonstrates
that due process challenges to rent regulations generally face a high
burden.175
The next part discusses the regulatory takings and due process challenges
levied against the RSL by the plaintiff landlords and the district court’s
reasoning for dismissing the claims in Community Housing Improvement
Program. These arguments are further examined and supported through
works of other scholars and public figures.
II. EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RSL
Although unsuccessful at the district court level,176 landlords have vowed
to continue the fight to cut the RSL down at its roots.177 This part examines
the arguments offered by the landlords and the court’s reasoning for dismissal
in Community Housing Improvement Program as it pertains to (1) the facial
regulatory takings claim and (2) the due process claim.
A. Does the RSL Effect a Regulatory Taking?
Even in the heyday of economic substantive due process,178 Justice
Holmes proclaimed that “[h]ousing is a necessary of life” and “a public
exigency will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in land to a
certain extent without compensation.”179 He further explained, however, that
“while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.”180
The Penn Central test governs whether the RSL goes “too far.”181 It
requires evaluating: (1) the character of the RSL’s regulation, (2) its
economic effect on the value of regulated property, and (3) its interference
with investment-backed expectations.182 Additionally, the Court has
described unconstitutional takings as government action that “forc[es] some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole.”183

174. See id. at 11 (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769–70 (1968)).
175. See id. at 11–13.
176. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 38
(E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020).
177. See Kromrei, supra note 17.
178. See The Rise and Fall of Economic Substantive Due Process, supra note 172
(discussing the history of the Court’s changing attitude toward states’ police power to interfere
with individuals’ economic rights and the apparent incorporation of laissez-faire economics
into the Court’s due process jurisprudence during the late 1800s and early 1900s).
179. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
180. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
181. See supra Part I.E.1 (discussing regulatory takings analysis).
182. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
183. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Seawall Assocs. v. City
of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (N.Y. 1989).
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1. Landlords Claim Concerning the Burden of the RSL
First, in challenging the RSL as an unconstitutional regulatory taking,
landlords cast the RSL as a public assistance benefit impermissibly borne by
landlords.184 Although this is not a new argument,185 it has been
reinvigorated through a New York Court of Appeals decision to exempt
debtors’ interests in their rent-stabilized leases from their bankruptcy estates
as a “local public assistance benefit” pursuant to New York debtor and
creditor law.186 Landlords would further add that it is an ineffective public
assistance benefit at that.187
Second, the Community Housing Complaint asserts that the character of
the RSL is “precisely the type of physical invasion that weighs in favor of
finding a regulatory taking.”188 Landlords claim the RSL is effectively a
physical invasion of property because it strips regulated property owners of
their “right to possess, use and dispose” of their apartments,189 as well as the
“right to exclude others.”190 In effect, landlords argue the RSL is physical in
character because it works to transfer property rights from owners to their
tenants.191
Third, the Community Housing Complaint attempts to demonstrate an
overwhelming economic impact effectuated by the RSL on owners of, and

184. Complaint, supra note 7, at 112–14; see Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
185. See Timothy L. Collins, “Fair Rents” or “Forced Subsidies” Under Rent Regulation:
Finding a Regulatory Taking Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1293, 1318
(1996).
186. See In re Santiago-Monteverde, 22 N.E.3d 1012, 1014–15 (N.Y. 2014) (answering the
following certified question in the affirmative: “Whether a debtor-tenant possesses a property
interest in the protected value of her rent-stabilized lease that may be exempted from her
bankruptcy estate pursuant to New York State Debtor and Creditor Law Section 282(2) as a
local public assistance benefit”).
187. See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining landlords’ argument that the RSL does not help
low-income New Yorkers).
188. Complaint, supra note 7, at 114; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (determining that regulation that “can be characterized as a physical
invasion” of property is more likely to be found a regulatory taking under the Penn Central
test).
189. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945) (describing
individual property rights over physical things as the “right to possess, use and dispose” of
those things); Complaint, supra note 7, at 5–6.
190. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (characterizing the right
to exclude others as “one of the most essential” property rights). More recently, the Supreme
Court has reaffirmed the importance of the property right to exclude others by striking down
a California regulation allowing union organizers access to growers’ property as a physical
taking. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072–74 (2021).
191. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 70–71. In the plaintiffs’ facial physical takings
challenge, they claim that the RSL effectuates a physical taking of property by giving tenants
full discretion to renew their leases, allowing judges to stay lawful evictions, limiting
landlords’ ability to retake property for personal use, and restricting landlords’ ability to
remove units from the rental market or convert them into co-ops or condos. See id. at 63–88.
While this Note does not seek to address the Community Housing Improvement Program
physical takings claim in depth, it is relevant to the assessment of the character of the RSL
under the Penn Central test. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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investors in, rent-stabilized property.192 Landlords point to the discrepancy
in rental rates between free-market and rent-stabilized apartments.193
According to the 2017 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS),
the median contract rent for regulated units was $1269 per month, a 2.6
percent increase from 2014.194 In comparison, the median rent for
unregulated units was $1700, a 10 percent increase from 2014.195
Additionally, the RGB estimates that while “owner costs have increased
5.4% [annually] on average over the last 20 years . . . the RGB’s approved
rent guideline increases have increased . . . 2.7% per year [on average] over
that period.”196
Further, the RGB’s 2020 net commensurate rent
adjustment197 is between 2.5 and 3.5 percent for one-year leases and between
3.3 and 6.75 percent for two-year leases.198 However, the new 2021 RGB
rent guidelines institute a rent freeze for one-year leases and only a 1 percent
increase for the second year of a two-year lease.199 Landlords argue they
cannot be made to rely solely on RGB increases for a reasonable return on
investment, as the 2019 HSTPA intends.200
Further, the Community Housing Complaint alleges that the RSL greatly
diminishes the value of stabilized units compared to those on the free
market.201 Even before the HSTPA was enacted, property assessments by
the New York City Department of Finance showed that “the market value of
a building with 25% or fewer regulated units had a per square foot market
value ($233/sq. ft.) of more than double the value of buildings in which 75%

192. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 92–112.
193. See id. at 93.
194. SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY
SURVEY, supra note 18, at 21. The HVS is the only survey that provides data specifically for
rent-stabilized tenants. See RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2020 INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY 17
(2020),
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020IE.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRU9-8DYL].
195. SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY
SURVEY, supra note 18, at 21; see also Complaint, supra note 7, at 93 (claiming that the RSL
has led one landlord to charge 70- to 80-percent-lower rent for regulated apartments than for
comparable nonregulated apartments in the same building).
196. Complaint, supra note 7, at 94.
197. The commensurate rent adjustment, “[i]n its simplest form, . . . is the amount of rent
change needed to maintain owners’ current dollar [net operating income] for their
rent-stabilized apartments at a constant level.” N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2020 PRICE
INDEX OF OPERATING COSTS 10 (2020), https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/2020-PIOC.pdf [https://perma.cc/44PG-ZYDP].
198. See id. The RGB calculates multiple commensurate rent adjustment rates using
different formulas. See MATTHEW MURPHY & MARK WILLIS, NYU FURMAN CTR., THE
CHALLENGES OF BALANCING RENT STABILITY, FAIR RETURN, AND PREDICTABILITY UNDER
NEW YORK’S RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM 5 (2019) (explaining the differences between the
five separate commensurate rent adjustment formulas).
199. See Kelly Mena, New York City Passes Rent Freeze for Stabilized Apartments, CNN
(June 18, 2020, 1:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/new-york-rentfreeze/index.html [https://perma.cc/J47R-ZQKT] (discussing rent relief efforts taken in
response to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic).
200. Complaint, supra note 7, at 89.
201. Id. at 95–99.
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or more of the units were regulated ($97/sq. ft.).”202 After the HSTPA’s
enactment, the sales values of buildings with rent-regulated apartments
plummeted.203 According to various brokers and investors, the value of
buildings with regulated apartments has fallen “about 25% on average.”204
In response, landlords have greatly reduced spending on apartment
renovations.205 Frank Ricci, executive vice president of the Rent
Stabilization Association (RSA), claims the RSL “remove[s] incentive[s] to
do upgrades beyond the minimum,” and others in the industry warn of decay
of the housing stock.206
Fourth, landlords contend that the RSL substantially interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations.207 The ETPA’s legislative
finding provides that “the transition from regulation to a normal market of
free bargaining between landlord and tenant [is] . . . the ultimate objective of
state policy.”208 Property owners argue that they should be able to rely on
this representation when investing, yet the 2019 HSTPA imposes more
regulation, not less.209
The Community Housing Complaint asserts that the 2019 HSTPA
“dramatically exacerbate[s] the regulatory takings effected by the RSL.”210
Landlords argue that the repeal of statutory vacancy and longevity rent
increases effectively eliminates their ability to increase the rent above RGB
guidelines, which consistently trail the annual increase in owners’ operation
costs, preventing a fair return on investment.211 Landlords also argue that
the elimination of luxury and high-rent decontrol destroys investment-backed
expectations that a unit may eventually be removed from rent stabilization
202. Id. at 97.
203. See Josh Barbanel, Sales of New York City Rent-Regulated Buildings Plummet After
New Law, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2020, 4:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sales-of-newyork-city-rent-regulated-buildings-plummet-after-new-law-11582754189 [https://perma.cc/
RYZ9-U9WN] (“The value of sales for buildings with at least one rent-regulated apartment
dropped by more than $4.1 billion in the second half of 2019 compared with the same period
the year before.”).
204. Will Parker & Konrad Putzier, Buyers Return After Rent-Control Slams New York
Apartment Values, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/buyers-return-after-rent-control-slams-new-york-apartment-values-11580817601
[https://perma.cc/G33P-MNQ4] (reporting that buyers have returned to take advantage of a
large drop in value in rent-stabilized buildings as current owners struggle to make loan
payments).
205. See Barbanel, supra note 113 (reporting a 44-percent decrease in renovation projects
for rent regulated buildings).
206. See id. But see David Hershey-Webb, The Intended Consequences of the HSTPA,
N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 10, 2019, 12:12 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/
12/10/the-intended-consequences-of-the-hstpa/ [https://perma.cc/VG5J-VCQC] (noting that
no previous predictions of widespread dilapidated housing due to rent regulation have come
to pass and claiming that “the real estate industry is starting to sound like the proverbial boy
who cried wolf”).
207. Complaint, supra note 7, at 99–100.
208. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8622 (McKinney 2019).
209. Complaint, supra note 7, at 99–100.
210. Id. at 101.
211. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the
effects of the HSTPA amendments on landlords’ property interests).
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and released into the free market.212 Further, landlords contend they cannot
collect reasonable returns on MCIs and IAIs under the new regulations.213
According to permit application records, “[t]he median interior renovation
project costs $60,000,” dwarfing the HSTPA’s allowable recovery cap of
$15,000 for IAIs.214 Landlords argue that even for improvements under
$15,000, “[o]nce the taxes associated with additional rent revenue is
considered,” landlords are unlikely to even recover the cost of investment.215
Plaintiffs also claim that the HSTPA’s formula for recovery of MCI expenses
makes it difficult for landlords to recoup their investments, much less earn a
reasonable return.216
Overall, landlords claim that the RSL, on its face: (1) is physical in
character, (2) drastically reduces the economic value of stabilized units, and
(3) destroys reasonable investment-backed expectations, thus satisfying the
regulatory takings test under Penn Central.
2. The Inapplicability of Facial Challenges to Regulatory Takings
The district court’s dismissal of the landlords’ facial regulatory takings
challenge pointed squarely to the inapplicability of such broad challenges to
the RSL.217 The decision cites United States v. Salerno,218 where the
Supreme Court declared that “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of
course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid.”219 In particular, precedent asserts that regulatory
takings challenges are especially ill-suited for facial analysis because of the
ad hoc and fact-intensive nature of the Penn Central test.220
212. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 103.
213. See id. at 103–07 (claiming that even before the 2019 Amendments, the MCI and IAI
regulations imposed a heavy financial burden, but now even recovery of the investment is
unlikely); supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the MCI and IAI amendments).
214. Barbanel, supra note 113.
215. Complaint, supra note 7, at 105.
216. See id. at 106–07; supra Part I.C.2.
217. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 44–
45 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (submitting that
while the legislature could someday “apply the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back”
and push the RSL into a regulatory taking, “it is unlikely that the straw in question will be
identified in the context of a facial challenge.”).
218. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
219. Id. at 745; see Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 45. But see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 941–
42 (2011) (using empirical data to challenge the assertion that facial challenges are especially
difficult to win).
220. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988) (“Given the ‘essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiry’ involved in the takings analysis, we have found it particularly important in
takings cases to adhere to our admonition that ‘the constitutionality of statutes ought not be
decided except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision necessary.’” (citation
omitted) (first quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); and then
quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 294–95 (1981));
W. 95 Hous. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 31 F. App’x. 19, 21 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he difficulty of such an assessment suggests that a widely applicable rent control
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In addition, the district court noted that it is bound by prior Second Circuit
decisions specifically rejecting regulatory takings challenges to the RSL.221
For example, in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. New York State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal,222 the Second Circuit found
that the RSL did not deprive the plaintiff of “economically viable use of the
property” even if the plaintiff “will not profit as much as it would under a
market-based system.”223 The district court also noted that the Second
Circuit has disparaged previous attempts to challenge the RSL under a facial
takings claim.224
The district court applied the Penn Central factors to demonstrate the
inapplicability of the landlords’ facial regulatory takings challenge to the
RSL.225 First, the court determined that economic impact “obviously needs
to be calculated on an owner-by-owner basis.”226 Accordingly, the court
determined the landlords’ claim necessarily failed because it offered only
vague allegations about the average diminution in value to regulated property
in general.227
Second, the court determined that reasonable
investment-backed expectations vary depending on the regulatory scheme in
place at the time of investment.228 Therefore, the court determined that the
landlords’ claim inappropriately asked it to assess the impact of the RSL on
investment-backed expectations at large, regardless of when an individual
owner entered the market or what that owner’s specific expectations were.229
Third, having already rejected the landlords’ arguments regarding economic
diminution and investment-backed expectations, the court determined the
plaintiffs could not prevail on claims that relied solely on the character of the

regulation such as the RSL is not susceptible to a facial constitutional analysis under the
Takings Clause.”); Rent Stabilization Ass’n v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding that to determine whether an RSL provision effectuated a regulatory taking, the court
must “engage in an ad hoc factual inquiry for each landlord who alleges that he has suffered
a taking” rather than assess the law in the abstract); David Zhou, Comment, Rethinking the
Facial Takings Claim, 120 YALE L.J. 967, 970–71 (2011). But see Guggenheim v. City of
Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We assume, without deciding, that a facial
challenge can be made under Penn Central.”), cert denied, 563 U.S. 988 (2011).
221. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 38, 44 (“[E]very
regulatory-takings challenge to the RSL has been rejected by the Second Circuit.”).
222. 83 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1996).
223. Id. at 48 (determining the plaintiff’s property had economic value under the RSL
because “it may still rent apartments and collect regulated rents”).
224. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 45 (first citing W. 95
Hous. Corp., 31 F. App’x at 21; and then citing Rent Stabilization Ass’n, 5 F.3d at 596).
225. See id. at 46–47.
226. Id. at 46.
227. See id.
228. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 46–47 (citing various
Second Circuit opinions in support of this proposition); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he regulatory regime in place at the
time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those
expectations.”). But see id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the notion that existing
restrictions, other than those forming “background principles” of state property law, have any
bearing on an assessment of investment-backed expectations in a takings challenge).
229. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 47.
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regulation prong of the Penn Central test.230 Therefore, the district court
dismissed the landlords’ regulatory takings claim.231
B. Does the RSL Violate Due Process of Law?
The Court previously held that due process challenges to rent regulation
statutes are subject to rational basis review.232 Therefore, a successful due
process challenge to a rent regulation must show that the measure is either
arbitrary, discriminatory, or not rationally related to a legitimate legislative
purpose.233
1. Landlords’ Belief Regarding the RSL’s Means and Ends
In Community Housing Improvement Program, landlords attacked the
RSL as a violation of due process by invoking the standard set in Pennell,
claiming the RSL is an “irrational, arbitrary and demonstrably irrelevant
means to address its stated policy ends.”234 In fact, they argue that not only
is the RSL not rationally related to the stated goals of the legislature, but it
often works against them.235 Landlords take particular issue with the notion
that the RSL is rationally related to: (1) providing low-income New Yorkers
with affordable housing, (2) promoting socioeconomic diversity, and (3)
increasing the supply of affordable housing.236 Further, they have
characterized property as a fundamental right and implored the court to
employ a stricter standard of review.237
First, landlords asserted that the RSL is not rationally related to achieving
the goal of providing low-income New Yorkers with affordable housing.238
The RSL contains no mechanism to match low-income renters with
rent-stabilized units.239 Apartments under the RSL are offered to the public
at large without regard to the financial status of the renter.240 Landlords

230. See id. Additionally, the court dismissed the landlords’ facial physical takings
challenge to the RSL, effectively deciding that the RSL’s character is not that of a physical
invasion of property. See id. at 43; see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528
(1992) (rejecting a physical takings challenge to a rent control ordinance on the basis that the
“laws at issue . . . merely regulate petitioners’ use of their land by regulating the relationship
between landlord and tenant” and do not compel owners to suffer a physical invasion).
231. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 47.
232. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988).
233. See, e.g., id.; see also Manheim, supra note 172, at 945–46.
234. Complaint, supra note 7, at 28; see also Pennell, 485 U.S. at 11.
235. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
236. See id. at 51–52.
237. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 29 (“Defendants must demonstrate that the RSL is
narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling governmental purpose.”).
238. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52; Complaint, supra
note 7, at 33 (quoting Matthew Murphy, former Deputy Commissioner of Policy and Strategy
at the New York City Department of Housing, Preservation, and Development, as claiming
that the RSL is a “critical resource” in providing lower-income households the choice to live
in New York City).
239. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 33.
240. See id.
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argue that the lack of targeting effectively turns the RSL housing stock into
a lottery where winners are chosen at random.241
The Community Housing Complaint lists numerous instances of wealthy
tenants with luxurious vacation homes refusing to part with rent-stabilized
units despite clearly not needing the RSL’s protection from the free
market.242 The Wall Street Journal reported that, in practice, affluent
residents are the biggest beneficiaries of rent regulation in New York.243
Further, landlords argue that the RSL does not serve significantly more lowincome renters than the free market.244 The NYU Furman Center published
data for 2011 showing that 65.8 percent of rent-stabilized tenants are
considered low-income, while 53.8 percent of tenants living in market-rate
units are considered low-income.245
Landlords point to the HSTPA’s elimination of luxury and high-rent
decontrol as evidence of the contradiction between the RSL and its policy
goal of providing affordable housing to low-income tenants or protecting the
tenancies of vulnerable tenants.246 They argue that the only people
benefitting from these amendments are wealthy New Yorkers who now will
not lose the protection of the RSL no matter how high their income or rent
grows.247
Second, landlords assert that the RSL is not rationally related to achieving
the goal of ensuring socioeconomic or racial diversity in New York City
communities.248 They insist the disconnect is based on many of the same
241. See id.; see also McPherson, supra note 45, at 1127 (criticizing the RSL for
indiscriminately providing benefits without regard to tenants’ needs, creating a “culture of
‘rental envy’” for those not fortunate enough to obtain a regulated apartment).
242. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 34–35 (listing examples of wealthy tenants residing
in rent-stabilized apartments).
243. See Josh Barbanel, Wealthy, Older Tenants in Manhattan Get Biggest Boost from Rent
Regulations, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wealthyolder-tenants-in-manhattan-get-biggest-boost-from-rent-regulations-11560344400
[https://perma.cc/KJY4-UW85] (reporting that the biggest discounts between regulated and
market rent occur in high-income neighborhoods and are captured by high-income residents,
providing “a policy conundrum” for state lawmakers who favor strengthening the RSL); see
also CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, RENT REGULATION: BEYOND THE RHETORIC 11 (2010),
https://cbcny.org/sites/default/files/REPORT_RentReg_06022010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3AX-P8YA] (“The greatest percentage discounts [created by the RSL] are
for those with incomes below $20,000 annually and for those with incomes between $125,000
and $175,000.”).
244. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 36.
245. NYU FURMAN CTR., PROFILE OF RENT-STABILIZED UNITS AND TENANTS IN NEW YORK
CITY 4 (2014), https://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter_FactBrief_RentStabilization_
June2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6HY-96AE]. The report defines low-income households as
those “earning no more than 80 percent of the Area Median Income.” Id. at 1 n.2. The
plaintiffs point to the NYU Furman Center in support of their argument that the RSL is not
rationally related to providing low-income New Yorkers with affordable housing. See
Complaint, supra note 7, at 36. But see Memo for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 26 (“Even
taking Plaintiffs’ allegations at face value, they concede that a substantial portion, if not a
majority, of rent-stabilized housing is occupied by low- to middle-income residents.”).
246. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 35; supra note 99 and accompanying text.
247. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 35; supra note 99 and accompanying text.
248. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 39–40.
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reasons as those explaining why the RSL does not provide affordable housing
for low-income New Yorkers, namely that the RSL is not targeted at serving
minority groups or promoting diversity.249 In fact, the Wall Street Journal
reported that “[w]hite renters in rent-protected apartments benefited more
than any other race group.”250 Further, the Community Housing Complaint
lists several scholarly works asserting that rent regulation in general is “an
ineffective tool for economic and racial integration.”251
Third, landlords assert that the RSL is not rationally related to achieving
the goal of increasing the supply of affordable housing.252 They claim the
RSL perpetuates the housing crisis because it does not increase the vacancy
rate.253
The RSL exerts price control over regulated properties, which landlords
argue reduces the incentive for owners to fully develop and maintain their
existing properties or invest in building new housing.254 Landlords
petitioned the court to heed the warnings of the majority of economists
asserting that rent regulation does “substantially more harm than good.”255
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, in evaluating San
Francisco’s rent regulations, noted that 93 percent of the American Economic
Association’s members agreed that rent ceilings reduced the quality and
quantity of housing.256 Krugman added that “[a]lmost every freshman-level
textbook” explains that rent regulation thwarts the growth of the housing
supply.257 Noted legal scholar Richard Epstein warns that all rent control
statutes decrease owners’ returns on investment, which leads to reduced
investment in new and existing properties and thereby exacerbates a housing
shortage.258

249. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 51–
52 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020).
250. Barbanel, supra note 243 (finding that white renters of stabilized units received a
36-percent discount from market rates, on average, while Black and Hispanic renters received
a 16-percent and 17-percent discount, respectively).
251. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 40.
252. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52; N.Y.C. COUNCIL,
supra note 88, at 44–45 (emphasizing the New York City Council’s view of the RSL as
important for creating and maintaining affordable housing in New York City).
253. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52; Complaint, supra
note 7, at 40. The state may not declare a housing emergency if the vacancy rate exceeds 5
percent, ending the primary basis for the RSL. Emergency Tenant Protection Act, N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW § 8623(b) (McKinney 2019).
254. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 40–41.
255. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
256. See id. at 52 (quoting Paul Krugman, Opinion, Reckonings; A Rent Affair, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/07/opinion/reckonings-a-rent-affair.html
[https://perma.cc/57A8-3E2L]).
257. See id. (quoting Krugman, supra note 256).
258. Richard Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 741, 767 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Rent Control]; see also Richard Epstein, The Rent
Is Too Damn Low, HOOVER INST. (June 17, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/rent-toodamn-low [https://perma.cc/JX5T-AG3N] [hereinafter Epstein, The Rent Is Too Damn Low]
(labeling the 2019 HSTPA as a misguided and unconstitutional rent measure).
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Notably, plaintiffs claim that in a self-conducted study of one hundred
Manhattan properties chosen at random—half “heavily stabilized”259 and
half containing no stabilized units—the regulated properties were underbuilt
by 18 percent on average compared to their zoning capacity, while the
unregulated properties exceeded their zoning capacity by an average of 22
percent.260 They allege that if the fifty regulated properties were built to the
same capacity as the unregulated properties, the housing market would be
infused with “over 600 units of 700 square feet apiece.”261 In effect,
landlords argue that the RSL can be empirically shown to discourage the very
development and investment necessary to alleviate the housing shortage and
increase the affordable housing supply.262
Landlords insist that the 2019 HSTPA serves only to expand the
disconnect between the RSL and its goal of increasing the supply of
affordable housing and ending the housing crisis.263 In particular, they point
out that the elimination of luxury and high-income decontrol strips landlords’
ability to remove units from a counterproductive system.264 Likewise,
landlords argue that the elimination of statutory vacancy and longevity
increases further reduces an owner’s return on investment, which leads to
reduced investment in existing and new properties.265
In addition, landlords argue that the HSTPA’s limitations on the recovery
of IAIs and MCIs will reduce owners’ returns on investment and discourage
landlords from properly maintaining their properties.266 They insist this will
result in a drastic reduction in the quality of New York’s housing stock—to
the point that units become uninhabitable and are pulled from the market,
thereby ultimately decreasing the quantity of affordable housing.267
Landlords also challenge New York City’s declaration of a housing
emergency (which triggers the RSL) as a violation of due process, claiming
the 5 percent vacancy rate threshold268 and the declaration itself are
arbitrary.269 First, landlords argue that the 5-percent vacancy rate threshold
259. Complaint, supra note 7, at 43 (defining the term “heavily stabilized,” for purposes of
the study, as a building where 75 percent or more of the units are stabilized).
260. Id. Properties can exceed their zoning capacity through “grants of special exceptions,
acquisition of air rights, or grandfathered buildings built under different zoning rules.” Id.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 42–44; see also Krugman, supra note 256 (explaining how the principles of
supply and demand dictate that rent regulation will not create more affordable housing).
263. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 45–48.
264. See id. at 45; see also Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492
F. Supp. 3d 33, 51–52 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020).
265. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 45; see also Epstein, Rent Control, supra note 258, at
767 (explaining that reductions in landlords’ returns on investment lead to reductions in new
investments, which exacerbate housing shortages).
266. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 45–48; supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (explaining the
HSTPA amendments to IAIs and MCIs and discussing landlords’ fears that the HSTPA
changes to IAIs and MCIs do not allow for a reasonable return on investment).
267. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 45–48; supra notes 113, 206 and accompanying text.
268. A local government may declare that a housing emergency exists when the housing
vacancy rate is 5 percent or lower. See Emergency Tenant Protection Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAW § 8623(b).
269. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
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set by the ETPA, under which a local government may declare a housing
emergency, is arbitrary because the legislature did not explain why it picked
that specific percentage.270 Further, the 5-percent threshold has not been
adjusted or justified since it was adopted in 1974.271
Second, landlords complain that the New York City Council reflexively
votes to affirm the existence of a housing emergency every three years
without any meaningful discussion as to whether a housing emergency
actually exists.272
Overall, landlords are adamant that the RSL is demonstrably not rationally
related to achieving its policy goals.273 They further allege that the existence
of the RSL is based on an arbitrary declaration of a housing emergency.274
Thus, landlords petitioned the court to strike down the RSL as a violation of
due process.275
2. The Highly Deferential Nature of Rational Basis Review
Faced with scathing rebukes to rent regulation by economists and
empirical evidence suggesting the RSL is detached from its policy goals,276
the district court rejected plaintiffs’ due process claim.277 The court made
clear that they are “engaged in rational-basis review . . . not strict
scrutiny.”278 Therefore, absent a showing of arbitrariness, irrationality, or
complete irrelevance to legitimate legislative goals, “the [c]ourt is bound to
defer to legislative judgments, even if economists would disagree.”279
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,280 the Court rejected a lower court
decision to strike down a rent control measure on the grounds that it did not
“substantially advance any legitimate state interest.”281 The opinion
admonished the lower court for attempting to substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature and reaffirmed that courts are discouraged from applying
heightened scrutiny to substantive due process challenges to economic
270. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 31.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 4–5; N.Y.C. COUNCIL, supra note 88, at 44–45. (stating that there is an
“affordability crisis” in New York City’s housing market that warrants extending the
emergency declaration but not discussing the reasons the crisis exists).
273. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52.
274. See id. at 51.
275. See id.
276. See supra Part II.B.1.
277. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52.
278. See id. at 52 (citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1988)). The court
rejected the landlords’ plea to hold the RSL to the standard of being “narrowly tailored to
achieving a compelling governmental purpose.” Complaint, supra note 7, at 29; see supra note
237 and accompanying text.
279. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 52; see also Pennell, 485 U.S.
at 11–12; W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (rejecting a due process
claim against an economic regulation under rational basis review and holding that “[e]ven if
the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature
is entitled to its judgment”).
280. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
281. Id. at 536.
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regulations.282 In the case at hand, the court followed Lingle’s holding and
took a highly deferential approach to the RSL.283
Further, the court noted that even if the RSL is not rationally related to
alleviating the housing emergency, the regulation can still be held valid if it
is rationally related to one of its other legislative purposes.284 Here, the court
found that the RSL is definitively rationally related to its goal of allowing
low-income New Yorkers to remain in their settled residences.285
The court also noted the landlords’ argument that the housing emergency
declaration was an arbitrary use of legislative power but did not directly
address the claim.286 This argument was likely rejected by the court similarly
opting to defer such decisions to the legislature. Overall, the court’s decision
largely hinged on the deference afforded to legislatures under rational basis
review.287
III. LANDLORDS’ FAILURE TO STRIKE DOWN THE NEW RSL
This part argues that the district court decision in Community Housing
Improvement Program to reject the landlords’ broad attempt to strike down
the entirety of the RSL as a regulatory taking or as a violation of due process
was correct and must be upheld in subsequent appellate proceedings. In
addition, this part advocates for the following policy additions to the RSL:
(1) pre-determined formulas to set annual regulated rent increases and (2)
means testing to determine renter eligibility for residence in a regulated
apartment.
A. The RSL Does Not Effect a Regulatory Taking
Facial challenges alleging that the RSL, a widely applicable measure, is a
regulatory taking are simply not conducive to the fact-intensive nature of the
Penn Central test.288 However, the HSTPA-amended RSL goes further than
any of its predecessors in restricting landlords’ property rights and interfering
with their ability to make a reasonable return on their investment.289 While
the district court correctly dismissed the landlords’ facial claims, the RSL
should be amended to change the RGB’s rent guideline increase calculation

282. See id. at 543–45.
283. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S.
at 544–45, in support of its decision to reject landlords’ due process challenge).
284. See id. (first citing Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); then citing Thomas v.
Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 1990)).
285. See id. It is a stated goal of the RSL to provide tenants with stability in their residency
and ameliorate the risk of tenants being priced out of their apartments due to the ongoing
housing shortage. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501 (finding the RSL necessary to prevent
the “uprooting [of] long-time city residents from their communities”); Manocherian v. Lenox
Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 484 (N.Y. 1994) (finding that the main purpose of the RSL is to
“ameliorate the dislocations and risk of widespread lack of suitable dwellings”).
286. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
287. See id. at 51–52.
288. See supra Part II.A.2.
289. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1.
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procedure to better achieve the RGB’s stated concern of providing “fair
returns for affected owners.”290
1. The RSL’s Susceptibility to Facial Regulatory Takings Challenges
The district court correctly rejected the landlords’ argument that the 2019
RSL, on its face, effectuates a regulatory taking of property.291 In Salerno,
the Court warned that a facial challenge to a legislative act is “the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully.”292 While this general proposition
may be overstated,293 there is not much debate over the immense difficulty
of asserting facial regulatory takings claims.294
Confronted with abundant precedent displaying contempt for such
challenges, landlords cited to the recent City of Los Angeles v. Patel295
decision, where the Court, noting the difficulty inherent in facial challenges,
stated it has “never held that [facial challenges] cannot be brought under any
otherwise enforceable provision of the Constitution.”296 Reliance on Patel
does nothing to save the landlords’ claim from the same treatment given to
other facial regulatory takings challenges to the RSL.297 First, Patel
addressed the applicability of facial challenges brought under the Fourth
Amendment, not facial regulatory takings claims.298 Second, while landlords
may not be precluded from merely bringing facial challenges, Patel does not
speak to the chances of success on the merits of such a claim.299 In fact, the
district court aptly demonstrated the inapplicability of the landlords’ claims
by applying the Penn Central test to show that they could not survive on the
merits.300 Third, landlords insist that Patel rejects the notion that facial
challenges to the RSL “must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which [the RSL] would be valid.”301 Accordingly, the standard would
limit the test to circumstances where the RSL is a restriction for regulated
property owners.302 Regardless of the control group, the RSL cannot be said
to take all regulated landlords’ property without assessing the diminution in

290. COLLINS, supra note 36, at 55–56.
291. See supra Part II.A.2.
292. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
293. See Fallon, supra note 219, at 917 (“[T]he assumption that facial challenges are and
ought to be rare . . . is false as an empirical matter and highly dubious as a normative
proposition.”).
294. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
295. 576 U.S. 409 (2015).
296. Id. at 415; see Memo for the Plaintiff, supra note 141, at 7–9.
297. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
298. See Patel, 576 U.S. at 412.
299. Cf. Fallon, supra note 219, at 964 (acknowledging that while facial challenges should
not be categorically disfavored, “there are often good reasons why facial challenges should
not succeed in particular cases”).
300. See supra Part II.A.2 (applying the Penn Central test to the regulatory takings claim).
301. See Memo for the Plaintiff, supra note 141, at 8 (quoting Rent Stabilization Ass’n v.
Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 595 (2d Cir. 1993)).
302. See Memo for the Plaintiff, supra note 141, at 8.
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value of an individual’s property and the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of the individual property owner.303
In their appeals, landlords may take some solace in the lukewarm assertion
offered by the Ninth Circuit in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta304: “[w]e
assume, without deciding, that a facial challenge can be made under Penn
Central.”305 But they should not. Ultimately, the court in Guggenheim found
that the mobile home rent control ordinance at issue did not cause a facial
regulatory taking.306 More importantly, while the court purports to be
assessing the claim as a facial regulatory takings challenge,307 the court is
actually conducting an as-applied analysis.308 Ultimately, facial regulatory
challenges seeking to strike down broad regulatory schemes like the RSL are
“vestige[s] of the pre-Lingle takings jurisprudence.”309
Furthermore, landlords inaccurately paint themselves as forced bankrollers
of a public welfare housing program.310 This characterization is unavailing
to their regulatory takings claim. The RSL merely regulates land use and the
landlord-tenant relationship.311 The New York Court of Appeals decision to
portray the RSL as a “local public assistance benefit” in In re
Santiago-Monteverde should be narrowly applied.312 The court was merely
answering a narrow certified question: “Whether a debtor-tenant possesses
a property interest in the protected value of her rent-stabilized lease that may
be exempted from her bankruptcy estate pursuant to New York State Debtor
and Creditor Law Section 282(2) as a ‘local public assistance benefit.’”313
Therefore, the decision should be limited in scope.
Ultimately, the district court was correct in its decision to dismiss the
landlords’ facial regulatory takings claims because the claims could not be
adequately assessed under the Penn Central test. Appellate courts should
affirm this decision and make clear that future regulatory takings challenges
to the RSL must be narrowly pleaded as-applied.

303. See supra Part II.A.2.
304. 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
305. Id. at 1118.
306. See id. at 1113–16.
307. See id. at 1119.
308. See id. at 1118–22 (discussing the reasonableness of the individual plaintiff’s specific
investment-backed expectation that the rent control ordinance would eventually be
terminated).
309. Zhou, supra note 220, at 977. Before Lingle, a plaintiff could allege a regulatory
taking by demonstrating that a “land-use regulation did not ‘substantially advance’ a
legitimate government interest.” Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,
542 (2005)). This type of challenge was much more conducive to a facial analysis because it
did not require plaintiff-specific facts. See id.
310. See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
312. See 22 N.E.3d 1012, 1015–16 (N.Y. 2014).
313. Id. at 1014–15.
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2. Curbing the RGB’s Discretion
While landlords failed to demonstrate that the HSTPA-amended RSL
broadly takes property from all regulated property owners, their complaint
raises serious issues314 that may fare better if brought as-applied.315 In
addition, the alleged deprivation of a reasonable return on investment
effectuated by the 2019 amendments could have consequences for the
quantity and quality of the regulated housing stock.316 This Note proposes
that the RSL be amended to substitute the wide discretionary power of the
RGB in setting annual rent increases with a pre-determined formula.317 Such
a change would depoliticize the rent guidelines process, defend against
as-applied takings challenges, and protect the regulated housing stock by
better safeguarding owners’ reasonable returns on their investments.318
The RGB states that a main consideration of the RSL is producing “fair
returns” for regulated landlords, consistent with owners’ constitutional rights
in their property.319 Part of takings jurisprudence is the ambiguous idea that
regulation should not deprive property owners of a reasonable return on
investment.320 Certainly, not every regulated landlord has been deprived of
a reasonable return by the 2019 HSTPA’s enactment, but it is entirely
314. See supra Part II.B.1 (alleging that the RSL, greatly expanded by the HSTPA, caused
a significant reduction in the value of regulated properties and deprived owners of a reasonable
return on investment).
315. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 49–
50 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (denying a motion
to dismiss certain as-applied regulatory takings claims made in the Pinehurst Complaint); see
also supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between facial and
as-applied challenges).
316. See supra notes 206, 266–67 and accompanying text; see also MURPHY & WILLIS,
supra note 198, at 9.
317. See MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 2–4, 7 (noting that the RGB has an unusual
amount of discretion in setting annual rent increases when compared to other jurisdictions
with rent regulation systems).
318. See id. at 9 (finding that the RGB’s annual rent increase decisions “are critical to both
affordability and the long-term quality” of the regulated housing stock); Vicki Been et al.,
Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1059 (2019) (noting that jurisdictions that endow boards with vast
discretionary authority to set rent increases “may be vulnerable to political or other
pressures”).
319. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 55.
320. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (deciding
that the regulation at issue was not a regulatory taking, in part, because owners were able to
make a “‘reasonable return’ on [their] investment”); Prop. Owners Ass’n of N. Bergen v. Twp.
of N. Bergen, 378 A.2d 25, 29 (N.J. 1977) (“[R]ent regulation must permit a just and
reasonable return.” (quoting Hutton Park Gardens v. W. Orange Town Council, 350 A.2d 1,
15 (N.J. 1975))); Complaint, supra note 7, at 90 (listing various factors courts have found
relevant to the investment-backed expectations analysis); Epstein, Rent Control, supra note
258, at 751. But see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436
(1982) (“[D]eprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every
case, independently sufficient to establish a taking.”); Park Ave. Tower Assocs. v. New York,
746 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[W]e hold . . . that the inability of [affected property
owners] to receive a reasonable return on their investment by itself does not, as a matter of
law, amount to an unconstitutional taking . . . .”); Manheim, supra note 172, at 961 (noting
the Supreme Court’s refusal to “be made an insurer of [property owners’] anticipated gains”).
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possible that some individual landlords have suffered this loss.321 However,
landlords bringing as-applied regulatory takings challenges still face a
“heavy burden” under the Penn Central test.322
Even absent a constitutional threat, the New York State Legislature should
consider the potential impact of the HSTPA amendments on landlords’
ability to earn reasonable returns, at least as it relates to the quantity and
quality of the regulated housing stock. The 2019 HSTPA, especially through
its amendments limiting recovery for IAIs and MCIs and eliminating vacancy
and preferential rent increases, constrains landlords’ ability to make
reasonable returns on their investments.323 New York landlords and real
estate investors warn that such burdensome regulation will lead to a decline
in housing quality and, worse, dilapidated housing and an increase in owners
warehousing apartments.324
Curbing the RGB’s discretion to determine annual rent increases will
alleviate concerns over potential, successful as-applied regulatory takings
challenges and the degradation of the regulated housing stock.325 Although
required to consider a number of factors, the RGB wields broad discretion in
establishing annual allowable rent increases for RSL regulated properties.326
The 2019 HSTPA amendments either eliminate or greatly reduce a landlord’s
ability to raise the rent beyond the RGB annual rent guidelines, exponentially
increasing the weight of the RGB’s discretionary authority on landlords’
ability to make a reasonable return on investment.327 Concerningly, the
RGB’s increase of annual rent guidelines often lags well behind the RGB’s
own calculation of landlords’ cost of operation increases, shrinking their net
operating income.328 Although the RGB calculates the commensurate rent
adjustment rate,329 it is free to decide how much weight to give the results.330

321. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 44–
45 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (commenting that
the RSL may well effect a regulatory taking but that such a taking is unlikely to be revealed
through a facial challenge).
322. Id. at 38–39 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
493 (1987)); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436; cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131
(first citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (finding that a
75-percent diminution in property value was not a taking); and then Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (finding that an 87.5-percent diminution in property value was not a
taking)).
323. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (discussing the HSTPA amendments and their effects on
landlords’ property interests).
324. See supra notes 113, 206 and accompanying text (discussing the HSTPA’s potential
effects on the regulated housing stock); see also MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 9.
325. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
326. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(b); MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 2–3.
327. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (describing the HSTPA amendments and their effects on
landlords’ property interests).
328. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text. “Net Operating Income (NOI) is
the gross revenue a property produces minus operating costs, not including any debt service.”
MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 3.
329. See supra notes 197–98 (describing the commensurate rent formula).
330. See MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 4.
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Further, the setting of the annual rent guidelines is highly vulnerable to
undue political pressure due to the RGB’s vast discretion.331 New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio, who openly favors a “socialistic” planned housing
market,332 has been open about his influence over RGB decisions.333 In
2017, after the RGB implemented its second rent freeze in as many years,
Mayor de Blasio boasted, “[t]hat’s never been done in history before . . . .
That happened under this administration because I instructed the [RGB]—I
name the members—and I instructed them to not follow the biases of the
past.”334 It is not difficult to imagine why landlords would be skeptical of
the RGB’s supposed concern for their fair returns and fearful about the
increased control of the RGB over their ability to obtain a reasonable return
on their investment.335
To address this issue, the New York State Legislature should curb the
discretion accorded to the RGB and adopt a pre-determined formula to set
the rent increases for regulated properties.336 Additionally, owner operating
costs should be based on “regional consumer price indexes produced by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.”337 However, there should be a maximum
cap on the annual increase, regardless of the calculation, and room for
discretion to account for unforeseen circumstances.338 Such a procedure
would greatly depoliticize the annual task of setting regulated rent increases
and better guard against as-applied regulatory takings challenges by
providing a more reasonable return on investment. It should also help to
prevent the decline of the regulated housing stock by more closely and
consistently tying allowable rent increases to increases in owner operating
costs.339
331. See Sally Goldenberg, De Blasio Touts Rent Freeze He “Instructed” Board to
Embrace, POLITICO (Mar. 15, 2017, 7:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/newyork/city-hall/story/2017/03/de-blasio-touts-rent-freeze-he-instructed-board-to-embrace110423 [https://perma.cc/9BLU-JWY5]. Relevantly, the RGB is composed of nine members,
all appointed by the mayor. See Been et al., supra note 318, at 1060.
332. Chris Smith, In Conversation: Bill de Blasio, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/09/bill-de-blasio-in-conversation.html
[https://perma.cc/UC2F-GQVD] (documenting Mayor Bill de Blasio decrying the elevated
status of private property rights in America which prevents the implementation of a planned
housing economy and his sympathy for the “socialistic impulse” of the New York City
community).
333. See Goldenberg, supra note 331.
334. Id.
335. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 87–88.
336. New York’s reliance on discretionary board authority in setting rent increases is the
minority position; most jurisdictions with rent regulation schemes rely on a pre-determined
formula. See MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 7. This Note will not venture to prescribe
an exact formula, but the formula will have to be one that is mutually agreeable to both tenant
and landlord advocates.
337. See id. The RGB produces its own “Price Index of Operating Costs (PIOC),” instead
of relying on a third-party index to calculate regulated owner operating costs. Id. at 4, 7.
338. The COVID-19 global pandemic may be considered an unforeseen circumstance.
339. This Note acknowledges that a pre-determined formula will not entirely address the
alleged issue that amendments to the RSL’s IAI and MCI provisions prevent landlords from
recovering the costs of necessary renovations. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (discussing IAI
and MCI effects on landlords’ property interests); see also Epstein, The Rent Is Too Damn
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B. The RSL Does Not Violate Due Process of Law
Due process challenges to broad economic regulations, such as the RSL,
that are aimed at promoting public welfare may be discarded upon the
government’s showing of some legitimate rational basis for the measure, a
highly deferential standard.340 In finding that such a regulation passes
rational basis review, a court does not pass judgment on the merits of a
legislature’s policy decision or even endorse it as an adequate means to
achieving the legislature’s goals.341 Therefore, while the district court
correctly dismissed the landlords’ due process claim, the constitutional
challenge exposed fundamental flaws in the RSL’s ability to direct its
benefits toward those who need its protection most.342 The introduction of
means testing to the RSL can help better target the RSL to helping low- and
middle-income New Yorkers.
1. The RSL Survives Rational Basis Review
The district court correctly rejected the landlords’ attempt to strike down
the RSL as a constitutional violation of due process.343 In Lochner v. New
York,344 Justice Holmes famously dissented, proclaiming that “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statics.”345 In doing so, he rejected the notion that the U.S. Constitution
“embod[ies] a particular economic theory”346 and set the foundation for the
Court’s modern substantive due process jurisprudence, which affords a
legislature a high level of deference in adjusting economic burdens.347 The
decision in Community Housing Improvement Project echoes Justice
Holmes’s dissent by refusing to supplant the rational judgment of New
York’s democratically elected legislature with the economic theories of Paul
Low, supra note 258 (claiming that the costs of renovation projects cannot be recovered under
the new provisions and positing that the new law goes too far and constitutes a taking).
340. See supra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 486–
87 (2d Cir. 1995).
342. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing landlords’ claim that the RSL fails to adequately
provide low-income renters with affordable housing).
343. See supra Part II.B.2.
344. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court struck down an economic regulation limiting working
hours for bakers as a violation of due process. See generally id.
345. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics is an endorsement
of social Darwinism and laissez-faire economics. See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court History:
Capitalism and Conflict, THIRTEEN (Dec. 2006), https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/
capitalism/history2.hhtm [https://perma.cc/9XFW-48CL]. Justice Holmes’s statement was
intended as criticism of the majority’s willingness to allow partiality for a particular economic
theory, such as Herbert Spencer’s, to override the will of the democratic majority. See id.;
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
346. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
347. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is
gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought.”).
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Krugman and Professor Richard Epstein as they relate to rent regulation’s
ability to alleviate the effects of a housing emergency.348
The RSL is a highly politically contentious measure, with fervent
supporters and detractors.349 The fact that reasonable minds could disagree
over the merits of the RSL is evidence that the RSL is not hopelessly
disconnected from its policy objectives.350 At its core, the RSL is charged
with “prevent[ing] exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents
and rental agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other
disruptive practices” during a housing emergency.351 The RSL’s regulation
of rent increases and tenant evictions is surely aimed at achieving these ends.
Additionally, the RSL does ensure that some housing remains affordable for
New Yorkers through rent regulation, and 65.8 percent of those protected by
the RSL are low-income tenants.352
Furthermore, the landlords’ characterization of the 2019 HSTPA
amendments as furthering the RSL’s drift from the legislature’s policy goals
is unavailing.353
Amendments eliminating luxury and high-income
decontrol, vacancy increases, and restricting IAIs and MCIs were direct
responses to rapid deregulation and the threat of the permanent loss of
affordable housing enabled by the prior RSL regime.354
While it is possible that there are objectively better policy options geared
toward providing affordable housing in the midst of a housing shortage with
less interference to property interests, it is too far to label the RSL as devoid
of any rational connection to its policy goals. Thus, the landlords’ due
process claim must fail in subsequent attempts to revive the argument at the
appellate level.
2. Targeting Low- and Middle-Income Renters Through Means Testing
The RSL has been touted as a vital tool in providing lower income tenants
the opportunity to afford living in New York City.355 However, landlords
correctly note that the 2019 RSL contains no mechanism to direct the RSL’s
348. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing Paul Krugman’s and Richard Epstein’s criticism of
rent regulation statutes).
349. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 1; supra notes 2, 79 and
accompanying text.
350. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that where reasonable
minds differ as to the soundness of an economic regulation, it is not the Court’s place to strike
it down as a violation of due process); see also Curtis J. Berger, Home Is Where the Heart Is:
A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1240–41, 1248 (1989)
(defending the general constitutionality of rent regulation and the RSL’s effectiveness in
providing tenants with an important sense of stability and community); Dean Preston & Shanti
Singh, Dear Business School Professors: You’re Wrong, Rent Control Works, SHELTERFORCE
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/03/28/rent-control-works/ [https://perma.cc/
7VRE-PT66] (arguing that rent regulation is effective policy and disputing certain economic
studies suggesting the opposite as methodologically flawed).
351. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501.
352. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part II.B.1.
354. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 238.
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protection toward New York’s low- and middle-income renters.356 Despite
landlords’ arguments to the contrary, this disconnect is not fatal to the RSL
under due process analysis.357 First, the RSL does in fact house a large
number of low-income renters, providing them with affordable rent.358
Second, the RSL is rationally related to many other goals, such as generally
preserving affordable housing in New York City359 and providing tenants
with housing stability through protection from unreasonable and
unpredictable rent increases.360 Although under no compulsion from due
process legal challenges, the New York State Legislature should modify the
RSL regime to better direct the RSL’s benefits toward assisting those who
actually need protection from the hardships associated with a free market
during a housing emergency.361 This policy goal can be accomplished by
adding a means test to the RSL.362
The legislature should adopt means testing to ensure that the RSL’s
benefits are focused on low- and middle-income tenants, to the exclusion of
wealthy tenants.363
The means test would only allow low- and
middle-income tenants to be eligible for a stabilized apartment and the RSL’s
protection.364 Such a test would require stabilized tenants to submit a yearly
tax return to the DHCR to show that they still qualify for RSL protection.365
To avoid abrupt disruptions of occupancy, tenants would have to show an
income over the specified threshold for a consecutive number of years before
being given a reasonable amount of time to vacate the regulated apartment
and relocate. Such a measure would increase the availability of affordable
regulated units for low- and middle-income tenants. Additionally, unlike the
prior RSL’s luxury and high-rent decontrol provisions, the proposed measure
would not deregulate the apartment itself; after reaching a certain threshold

356. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.B.1.
357. See supra Parts II.B.2, III.B.1.
358. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
361. The RSL has allowed wealthy tenants to obtain stabilized apartments and take
advantage of the RSL’s protection despite being perfectly capable of competitively transacting
in the unregulated housing market. See supra notes 242–43 and accompanying text. The
HSTPA’s elimination of the RSL’s luxury and high-rent decontrol provisions removed any
statutory means of preventing wealthy tenants from benefitting from the RSL. See supra notes
246–47 and accompanying text.
362. See Konrad Putzier, The Long View: The Fix That Could Create Thousands of
Affordable Housing Units Overnight, REAL DEAL (Dec. 21, 2016, 1:53 PM),
https://therealdeal.com/2016/12/21/the-fix-that-could-create-thousands-of-affordablehousing-units-overnight [https://perma.cc/3YUS-GVDU].
363. This Note does not attempt to place exact thresholds for qualifying a person as low-,
middle-, or high-income for purposes of RSL eligibility. However, the scope for low- and
middle-income should be sufficiently wide as to only exclude those who clearly do not need
protection from the unregulated housing market.
364. This restriction would not be enforced retroactively. It would take effect only after
the tenant currently occupying a regulated unit at the time of enactment has vacated the unit.
365. See Putzier, supra note 362 (describing how an RSL income-based means test could
be modeled).
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rent, it would merely remove the means testing requirement.366 In doing so,
the proposed measure would both preserve the regulated housing stock and
more efficiently pair affordable units with renters who need the RSL’s
protection from New York’s unregulated housing market amidst a housing
crisis.
Currently, no jurisdiction employing a rent regulation scheme utilizes a
means test as a tenant qualification.367 The primary arguments against such
a policy are that it imposes high administrative costs and that it is detrimental
to garnering broad political support for rent regulation.368 However, these
arguments do not pose insurmountable barriers preventing the adoption of
means testing to the RSL. First, New York already employs means testing
in its Mitchell-Lama housing program,369 and the RSL can use this as a model
for its administration of RSL means testing.370 Second, efficiently directing
the RSL’s benefits toward low- and middle-income tenants can help reduce
spending elsewhere on the creation and preservation of affordable
housing.371 Third, this Note contends that a progressive city like New York
City may well support an effort aimed at providing low- and middle-income
tenants with affordable housing, even if it means that a particular voter will
be, or may become, ineligible to rent a stabilized apartment.
CONCLUSION
The HSTPA is the strongest, most tenant-friendly version of New York’s
RSL in history. Despite the increased restrictions on landlords’ property
interests, the district court correctly rejected landlords’ attempt to dismantle
the entire RSL regime as an unconstitutional regulatory taking or a violation
of due process. However, the constitutional challenge exposed legal and
policy concerns that stem from the new RSL amendments. Tying annual rent
increases to a pre-determined formula, as opposed to the wide discretion of
the RGB, will better ensure that landlords have the opportunity to earn a
reasonable return and incentivize owners to maintain the regulated housing
stock. Additionally, employing a means test to determine tenant eligibility
366. This threshold rent for removing the means test would need to be set at a price
prohibitively higher than could be afforded by a low- to middle-income renter.
367. See Been et al., supra note 318, at 1054.
368. See id. at 1053–54; Putzier, supra note 362.
369. The Mitchell-Lama Rehabilitation and Preservation Program offers building
developers “low-cost financing” for housing construction projects in exchange for keeping
rents in those buildings affordable for a specified period of time. See Directory of NYC
Housing Programs: Mitchell-Lama Rehabilitation and Preservation Program (RAP),
NYU FURMAN CTR., https://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/mitchell-lamarehabilitation-and-preservation-program [https://perma.cc/CA8N-YHMT] (last visited Sept.
17, 2021).
370. See Putzier, supra note 362.
371. Seth Pinsky, former head of the New York City Economic Development Corporation,
in discussing means testing for the RSL, claimed that the city is “spending billions [on
affordable housing programs], when overnight we could free up tens of thousands of units at
no cost.” Putzier, supra note 362; see also Adam Zeidal, Affordable Housing: The Case for
Demand-Side Subsidies in Superstar Cities, 42 URB. LAW. 135, 140–41 (2010) (discussing the
high costs associated with New York City’s affordable housing developer subsidy programs).
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for regulated units will better target the RSL toward providing affordable
housing for low- and middle-income New Yorkers. Advocates on both sides
should be willing to address these concerns and seriously consider these
policy proposals.

